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INTRODUCTION
The conventional account of nineteenth-century marriage goes something
like this: Couples met, and they, unlike their ancestors, married for love.1 Men
and women were transformed into husbands and wives. Husbands assumed
their legally and culturally assigned role of provider and protector. In exchange
for providing shelter and putting food on the table, they exacted obedience and
sexual submission, and expected their wives to cheerfully birth and nurture
children. Wives willingly assumed their place in the domestic sphere,
submitted to their husbands' rule in exchange for their protection, and ceased
having an independent legal identity. 2 But despite these rigid roles, they placed
high expectations on the relationship: Wives hoped for a romantic,
communicative, and fair-minded protector; husbands for a supportive, gentle,
and loving companion. 3 Marriages were fundamentally stable, but as the
century progressed, expectations rose, and marital instability increased as those
expectations went unfufilled.4  Strict divorce laws, however, typically
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1. See text accompanying note 287-288 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 67-71 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 287-289 infra.
4. See text accompanying note 290 infra.
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prevented an easy exit, so couples either resigned themselves to an unhappy life
together or colluded to obtain a divorce to which they were not legally
entitled. 5 The divorce rate exploded, signifying the decay of marriage as an
institution.
Hendrik Hartog, in Man and Wife in America: A History, both challenges
and informs this traditional account of nineteenth-century marriage.6 In
Hartog's account, husbands and wives did not adhere to the rigid roles
prescribed by the common law. Their marriages were not fundamentally
stable, as reflected in the high rate of separation. And couples did not live
together or live apart based solely on the whim of a state's divorce law.
Couples wishing to split exercised a variety of options, including most notably
living apart without court approval. Marriage, in the end, may have been
strengthened as an institution by laws that allowed spouses out of a bad
marriage and into a better one.
Seamlessly weaving together a wide variety of sources, 7 Hartog constructs
a compelling vision of marriage as it was understood in the nineteenth
century-a publicly regulated, standardized relationship that unified husband
and wife beginning with the words "I do" (or the common law equivalent)s and
ending with the death of one spouse.9 His work tells a story of nineteenth-
century husbands and wives and the lives they made for themselves within the
governing legal regime. 10 He couches his story in the language and experience
5. See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
6. Hartog began this project in an earlier piece. See Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and
Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95 (1991).
7. Hartog relies primarily on appellate cases, family law treatises, and primary sources
such as trial transcripts and memoirs relating to highly publicized or hotly contested
separations and divorces.
8. Common law marriage, a relationship given legal recognition despite the lack of a
license and formal solemnization, played an important role throughout the nineteenth century
in the state-to-state conflict over the regulation of marriage and the ease of divorce. See pp.
14-15. It became popular and widely accepted in the early nineteenth century, but grew
weaker as the century progressed, and was eventually abolished in most states. See
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMrLY IN NNmTEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 64-102 (1985); see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to
Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 742-43 (1996); Ariela R. Dubler,
Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 YALE
L.J. 1885, 1888-90 (1998). Today, common law marriages are valid only in a handful of the
states, though many states recognize common law marriages validly formed elsewhere. See
Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens,
55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 11 n.43 (2000).
9. Hartog looks at husbands and wives to understand marriage, while Nancy Cott looks
at marriage from the outside. Cott, in her recent book, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF
MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000), explores the connections between marriage,
immigration, citizenship, equality, and theories of governance.
10. Hartog differs in his approach from many family law historians, who look at
nineteenth-century marriage to explain the evolution of modem legal rules. Hartog's goal,




of separation,I an aspect of the history of marriage that has been undervalued.
His focus on separation exposes a weakness in the conventional account in its
failure to consider non-legal marital exits and its concomitant overstatement of
the extent to which divorce law controlled social relationships.
Hartog explores separation from 1790 to 1950, though the focus is the pre-
1870 period. Throughout, he emphasizes neither the abstract governing law,
nor the private emotions and values, but their points of intersection. His
skillful illustration of how law sometimes shaped private marriages, but more
often bent to accommodate them even at the expense of theoretical purity,
makes this book a uniquely valuable contribution to the historiography of
marriage.' 2
This review is comprised of three parts, reflecting the three marital statuses
informed by Hartog's exploration of separation: intact marriage, separation,
and remarriage. Part I explains Hartog's contribution to our understanding of
intact marriages-married couples living together. Separation turns out to be
an important source of evidence about marital rights, duties, and expectations,
for only when a couple separates does legally enforcing them become possible
or important. Through an examination of cases involving separate estates and
prenuptial agreements, suits to enforce separation agreements, and suits for
separation or divorce, he draws a picture of nineteenth-century marriage that
reconsiders notions of transformation, unity, and coercion as experienced by
ordinary husbands and wives. Courts, he concludes, did not require
unforgiving adherence to the legally prescribed roles as the conventional
account might suggest. Couples, instead, were governed by a kinder, gentler
coverture, one that accommodated the realistic needs of women to retain legal
identity in some circumstances, and be protected from coercion in others.
In this Part, I suggest that the formal principle of marital unity nonetheless
mattered because it was used to determine women's rights in other contexts. I
also explore, drawing primarily on a study of divorce records from Alameda
County, California, 13 whether the availability of divorce on grounds of cruelty
placed additional limits on husbandly coercion.
11. Hartog describes himself in the introduction as "fixated on separation." P. 1.
12. For other important contributions to this historiography, see generally NORMA
BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAw: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); Corr, supra note 9; GROSSBERG, supra note 8; AMY DRU
STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKEr IN
ThE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); Hartog, supra note 6; Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule
of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996) [hereinafter
Siegel, Rule of Love]; Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims
Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994) [hereinafter
Siegel, Home as Work]; Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law:
Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. L.J. 2127 (1994) [hereinafter
Siegel, Marital Status Law].
13. Throughout this review, there are references to a study of divorce records in
Alameda County, California. The study, conducted by Chris Guthrie and Joanna Grossman,
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Part II explores separation as a marital status: couples who were legally
married but living apart. Separation is an important indicator of marital
instability, and its prevalence in the nineteenth century calls into question the
conventional assumption of marital stability. Separation, a category that
encompasses couples living apart lawfully (by order of a court) and unlawfully
(by simple separation), has also been underexamined as a status by other
historians, who have focused on divorce law as the primary means of regulating
private relationships and the primary indicator of marital failure. Separation
was a defining facet of nineteenth-century life, and served as more than a
transition to or substitute for divorce. It was instead, Hartog argues, the desired
end for couples who valued marriage as a lifelong commitment, but could not
live within its day-to-day constraints. This description is in stark contrast to the
modem sense of separation as a prelude to divorce. But Hartog's work
suggests not only a nineteenth-century preference for separation over divorce,
but also one for informal over formal separation.
These claims need to be substantiated with further research. This review
briefly examines the legal and practical availability of divorce, and the relative
consequences of absolute divorce, legal separation, and informal separation in
order to begin the project of assessing Hartog's claims. Much of the focus in
this Part is on why women would prefer informal separation, when that status
gave them the least in terms of financial security and emotional fulfillment.
This section also considers how separation changes the conventional
understanding about the relationship between divorce law and marital stability.
Part III looks at a third marital status: remarriage (legal or otherwise).
Separation and the law's treatment of it illustrate the importance of marriage-
and remarriage-to ordinary men and women. Hartog describes a system that,
although premised on the fundamental importance of marriage and its
permanence, did not force couples by and large to stay married. The actions of
courts, legislators, and individuals instead intersected to preserve marriages that
were viable, but to permit exit and remarriage where they were not. Courts
took on a marriage-saving function, which differed from the approach in
previous centuries in that they did not insist on saving first marriages. The
social importance of marriage influenced law, both through the enactment of
statutes permitting remarriage and the lax enforcement of statutes, like those
against bigamy, preventing it. Hartog's research provides a way to reconcile
the nineteenth century's growing separation and divorce rate with the
continuing strength of the ideal of marriage.
In this Part, I consider why marriage continued to be important for
individuals, particularly women, who often traded aspects of freedom for
marriage.
is based on a 20% random sample of all divorce cases filed between 1890 and 1910 in that




I. STATUS ONE: MARRIED (AND LIVING TOGETHER)
Nineteenth-century marriage implicates several different "histories:" a
social and economic history that explains its role in relationship to work,
childrearing, and community relationships; a political history that relates it to
political participation, community governance, or women's quest for equality;
and a psychological or literary history that sheds light on the relevance of
romantic love and individual fulfillment to marriage. 14 But it also has a legal
history, not just an arid description of the statutes labeled "Marriage and
Divorce," but a vibrant, rich history that captures the role of law-both as
received and as practiced-in regulating relationships, and the myriad ways in
which husbands and wives navigated through and around legal norms and
mandates. It is to that complex history that Hartog contributes.
A. Methodology
Marriage is more than a legal status, and using legal documents to explain
it is vulnerable to criticism. But law was important to married couples for
"beginnings and endings:"'15 when they entered into marriage, when they
attempted (usually unsuccessfully) to individualize its terms, when they
informally separated, or when they took their marital conflicts to state courts
across the country. Hartog anticipates and ably responds to the critique that
legal documents do not reveal anything about how real men and women
conducted their lives and their marriages. He rejects the "conception of a
'realer' self, unrevealed in legal texts."'16 Regardless of whether husbands and
wives came to court voluntarily or under coercion, he argues, the stances they
took there revealed "who they were, in their legal dealings and identities,"
though "other presentations and performances, occurred elsewhere."'17
The notion that legal documents constructed at the end of a marriage can
provide insight into the marriage itself is important (though not new), for a
purely non-legal history of marriage is surely incomplete. Letters, diaries,
journals, and memoirs from the nineteenth century are restricted to the elite
classes. 18 Prescriptive literature about the proper way to conduct a marriage,
for example, is of limited value without some evidence that the prescribed
14. See p. 2 (acknowledging the existence of aspects of "nineteenth-century marriages
more deeply private, less strategic, more intensely religious or intimate, hidden from law, yet
definitive of marriage").
15. P. 24.
16. P. 3 n.4.
17. Id. Nancy Cott makes a similar point, noting that "[r]eading the legal record for
cultural and social insights need not conflict with awareness that the law represents coercive
power." COT, supra note 9, at 8.
18. See, e.g., ROBERT L. GRIswoLD, FAMILY AND DIvORcE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890:
VICTORIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 2 (1982).
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ideals actually affected human behavior.19 Legal materials elucidating the
rights and duties couples tried to enforce, what breaches of conduct might have
led them to seek an "early exit,"20 and what remedies they sought and received
from local courts are, then, an important addition to this picture.
To construct his legal history of marriage, Hartog relies on a
comprehensive compilation of appellate cases from the notoriously strict New
York and the notoriously liberal California, nineteenth-century commentary on
the law of husband and wife (regulating the ongoing marriage) and the law of
marriage, divorce, and separation (regulating marriage's beginning and end),
and trial transcripts in highly publicized, usually scandalous cases.21
Each of his sources provides a unique piece to the puzzle of marriage.
Appellate cases reflect judicial norms and limn boundaries within which
married couples functioned.22 They also control to a significant extent the
dialogue of marriage and its dissolution, as lawyers and litigants incorporate the
language and standards of appellate courts in framing subsequent cases. 23
Treatises played both a positive and normative role in law and its development.
They ostensibly describe or restate the law as developed by courts and
legislatures, but also sometimes describe the law as it ought to be, in an effort
to influence decisionmakers. 24 Hartog also makes use of exceptional cases to
illustrate his descriptions of marriage law and behavior. These cases not only
give nineteenth-century marriage a human face, but also provide a running
reminder that the proper focus is not law in the abstract, but law as it affected
19. There are obvious flaws in using prescriptive literature to draw conclusions about
actual behavior. See, e.g., id. at 3 n.8 (collecting authorities).
20. This is Hartog's term for an end to marriage brought about by something other than
death. P. 63.
21. P. 315. He also refers occasionally to trial pamphlets in these exceptional cases.
Pamphlets-a tool of the rich litigant in the nineteenth century-were privately published
documents dramatizing the "cast of characters" and the marital dispute. See NORMA BASC,
FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS
143, 147-85 (1999) (analyzing mid-century divorce through an examination of pamphlets).
Pamphlets were common in cases that most captured the public imagination-where a
husband murdered his wife's lover. One such case involved Daniel Sickles, a member of
Congress, who murdered his wife's lover, Philip Barton Key, the son of Francis Scott Key.
Sickles published a pamphlet, reproducing for the public his lawyer's opening and closing
speeches to the jury. P. 220.
22. Appellate cases also have the virtue of being available to any scholar, who may
look at them and draw different conclusions. See Gary Schwartz, The Character of Early
American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641, 645 n.14 (1989). But see G. Edward White, The
Appellate Opinion as Historical Source Material, 1 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 491 (1971)
(discussing drawbacks of using appellate cases in historical research).
23. See note 34 infra.
24. Hartog aptly illustrates this normative function in the marriage context. James
Kent, author of the well-known COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw (1826), and Tapping
Reeve, author of an influential treatise, THE LAw OF BARON AND FEMME (1816), insisted that
separate maintenance agreements were enforceable, despite the fact that the law was clearly
to the contrary. Pp. 80-81.
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real men and women.25 They also are some evidence of the ways in which the
prescribed law of marriage, separation, and divorce bent to accommodate real
people amidst domestic turmoil.
Hartog does not use local trial records in cases of separation or divorce, but
suggests that as an area of future research.26 An examination of trial records in
divorce and separation cases would enable other researchers not only to test
Hartog's claims, but also to fill in the gaps. Trial records provide important
information about the legal system that appellate cases miss. In the context of
divorce or separation, for example, they reveal what percentage of petitions
were denied, dismissed, or granted and on what grounds, how long the process
took, how long couples had been married before splitting up, how many
petitions were filed by women, the demographic profile of litigants, and the
results obtained in terms of custody, child support, alimony, and property
division. From those numbers, one may draw inferences about the relative
benefits of separation versus divorce and the deterrents to seeking formal
recognition of marital breakup.27
Trial court records in both divorce and separation cases can also be used to
understand marriage itself. Prior to the no-fault revolution beginning in the late
1960s, all states insisted that divorce be, at least in form, an adversarial
process.28 A divorce was a remedy granted to an innocent party who could
prove she had been wronged on one of the grounds recognized by the state.29
The prohibition of consensual divorce had two consequences. First, a divorce
25. Many modem family law historians have recognized the value of closely
examining highly publicized or exceptional cases. See, e.g., MICHAm- GRosSBERG, A
JUDGMENT FOR SOLOMON: THE D'HAUTEVILLE CASE AND LEGAL EXPERIENCE IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA (1996) (examining a single contested custody case from the nineteenth century to
illustrate social and legal culture); see also Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal
History of Acting Married, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 957, 976 nn.74-76 (2000) (collecting
examples of historians using particular cases to illuminate cultural meaning in the nineteenth
century).
26. P. 316.
27. See text accompanying notes 231-243 infra.
28. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical
Perspective, 63 OR. L. REv. 649, 653 (1984).
29. Innocence was policed by the typical defenses to a claim of divorce. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIv. CODE § 122 (Hart 1889) (listing defenses). Recrimination was a defense that
accused the filing party of also committing grounds for divorce. Condonation occurred
when the innocent party continued to live with the guilty party after learning of marital
misconduct. P. 66 (noting that divorce required proof that "one spouse, and one spouse only,
had fundamentally breached his or her obligations as a spouse"); pp. 68-69 (describing the
case of Jane and Peter Williamson, who were condemned to a lifelong marriage because his
adultery was cancelled out by her remarriage-and thus her adultery as well). Connivance
involves consent to the commission of the conduct constituting grounds for divorce. Proof
of recrimination, condonation, or connivance, in many states, deprived the court of discretion
to grant a divorce. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 122 (Hart 1889). Nancy Cott argues that
innocence was enforced more stringently for female plaintiffs whom courts required prove
conformity with role expectations. See COT, supra note 9, at 49.
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could not be granted by default when one party failed to appear;30 the plaintiff
in such a case still had to present evidence of the grounds alleged.31 Second,
even where defendants did appear, a court could not grant a divorce based
solely on an uncorroborated confession of the defending spouse. 32
Consequently, most trial records contain a detailed complaint setting forth the
alleged wrongs as well as testimony of at least one witness corroborating the
allegations. The conduct that leads spouses to seek a divorce or separation
reveals something about the expectations they held for marriage. As Nancy
Cott has explained:
The causes that gave rise to divorce petitions should show the boundaries of
normal marital expectations, just as actions construed as criminal indicate
societal limits. And while the defendants' behavior threatened accepted
norms, the petitioners and the deponents-who supplied almost all of the
information in the records-preserved them. There seems every reason to
accept the portrayal of domestic life and social surroundings in the divorce
records as valid, while maintaining caution about possible distortions
introduced by the defendants' behavior.3 3
Trial records, however, are not without limitations. On the one hand,
allegations may be stronger than the real facts because parties want to ensure
that the divorce will be granted. And lawyers tend to be risk averse; they are
likely to characterize the facts in a way they know will be accepted by a
court.34 This may result in exaggerated depictions of marital strife, calculated
to justify the requested divorce. On the other hand, parties may understate the
allegations in order to hide embarrassing, private facts from the public eye.
Fear of publicity was probably justified. Divorce was uncommon enough
throughout the nineteenth century that local newspapers kept tabs on them.
The Oakland Tribune, for example, had a weekly column at the turn of the last
century called "The Divorce Mill," in which it reported on the filing and
granting of divorce petitions.35
30. Cf Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13 (finding that only
28% of divorce defendants appeared in court); GRIswoLD, supra note 18, at 189 n.12
(finding that 30% of divorce defendants appeared in court).
31. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 130 (Hart 1889) (providing that "no divorce can be
granted upon the default of the defendant, or upon the uncorroborated statement, admission
or testimony of the parties... but the court must, in addition... require proof of the facts
alleged").
32. Id.
33. Nancy F. Cott, Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Life Revealed in
Massachusetts Divorce Records, 10 J. Soc. HIsT. 20, 21 (1976); see also GRISWOLD, supra
note 18, at 21-23.
34. P. 27 ("Lawyers' predictions led husbands and wives to assume identities
recognizable in the law, to make themselves into legal subjects.... Predictions about how a
court would react also led litigants to impose identities on their opponents."). This tendency
is certainly reflected in the widespread evidence of collusive divorce, where couples
constructed the whole story of marital strife for the court. See text accompanying note 246
infra.
35. See, e.g., The Divorce Mill: The Domestic Troubles of Unhappy Couples Aired in
[Vol. 53:16131620
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The most worrisome concern about relying upon divorce records is the
problem of collusion. By all accounts, nineteenth-century divorce cases were
plagued by collusion.36 Despite explicit prohibitions under state law37 and the
requirement that grounds for divorce be proven and corroborated, 38 consensual
divorce was quite common. Although the pervasiveness of collusion ultimately
spurred significant changes in divorce law,39 its prevalence in the nineteenth
century limits the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from court
testimony and records about the real marital behavior underlying the petitions
for divorce.
There are an assortment of useful studies of divorce using trial court
records, 40 which can be used to examine discrete aspects of Hartog's work.
Some very preliminary testing based on those studies is done in this review,41
Court, OAKLAND DAILY EVENING TRm., July 21, 1890, at 8 (reporting that the "usual number
[5] of divorce cases were heard in court this morning"). Newspapers reported on individual
cases as well. See, e.g., Gave Up Her Home to Shine on the Stage, OAKLAND TRm., Jan. 2,
1900, at 8 (reporting that Emma Sutter's "ambition overcame her love for her husband,"
causing her to abandon him and move to New York).
36. See p. 22 ("Perjury, collusion, fiction were all crucial parts of divorce practice.");
see also J. HERBIE DiFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE
OF DIVORCE IN TwENTETH-CENTURY AMERICA 111 (1997) (observing that fault was "less a
barrier and more a tunnel for divorce"); Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the
Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 809, 826-27 (1998) ( "The practice of collusive divorce is
well-documented in earlier fault-based divorce regimes."); Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead
Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2000)
("The divorce laws in practice had almost nothing in common with the divorce laws on the
books."); Friedman, supra note 28, at 659 (concluding that the "basic change [in the late
nineteenth century] was the rise of consensual divorce... in the teeth of statutes that refused
to admit that such a thing was legally possible"); Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V.
Percival, Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD.
61, 65 (1976) (noting that collusion "was the norm before the end of the nineteenth
century"). Local newspapers sometimes reported on collusive divorces. See, e.g., Strong
Evidence of Collusion, OAKLAND TRm., Nov. 14, 1980, at 1 (reporting that Ada and Sherman
Phillips were denied a divorce because the court suspected collusion).
37. Evidence of collusion typically deprived courts of discretion to grant a divorce.
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ch. 65, § 4 (1843); ME. REV. STAT. tit. V, § 18 (1871); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 6232 (Howell 1890).
38. New York, for example, had only one ground for divorce-adultery-and required
proof of it. Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 65.
39. See text accompanying note 249 infra.
40. See, e.g., BASCH, supra note 21 (studying court records in New York and Indiana);
GRISWOLD, supra note 18 (studying court records in California); ELAIN TYLER MAY, GREAT
EXPECTATIONS: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POsT-VICTORiAN AMERICA (1980) (studying
court records in New Jersey and California); Cott, supra note 33 (studying divorce records in
Massachusetts); Friedman, supra note 36 (studying divorce records in California); Grossman
& Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13 (studying court records in California).
Trial records have also been useful in studies of other aspects of nineteenth-century family
law. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1359 (1983) (using court records to explain early developments in married women's
property law).
41. The data from Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13, is used
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but a great deal more is necessary. And there have been almost no similar
studies of separation cases.42 Hartog makes a compelling case that separation
is integral to any understanding of marriage, and empirical studies of
nineteenth-century separations would be a natural complement to his research.
B. Separation and the Development of the Law of Marriage
The law of separation and marriage was-and is today-determined, by
and large, by state courts interpreting state law.43 Until 1858, couples had at
least a theoretical possibility of having their domestic relations cases heard in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction-if they could successfully
establish that the spouses were not residents of the same state. But in 1858, the
Supreme Court heard Barber v. Barber,44 a case in which the practical
constraints on that jurisdictional right came to light. When Mrs. Barber went to
court, wives faced one obstacle to federal jurisdiction; when she left, they faced
two.
In Barber, a New York wife got an order awarding her separate
maintenance from her abandoning, but still lawfully wedded husband.45 He
subsequently divorced her in Wisconsin, his new home.46 She followed him
and tried unsuccessfully to enforce her New York order of support in
Wisconsin state court.47 When she failed, she went to federal court.
One of the basic principles of coverture-the idea that a woman's legal
existence is covered over by her husband's during marriage 48-posed a
roadblock to her suit in federal court. Married women, according to that
principle, were legally domiciled with their husbands, regardless of whether
they lived in the same place.49 The catch-22 for Mrs. Barber was this: If she
for this purpose.
42. One exception is a study of eighteenth-century newspaper advertisements placed
by husbands or wives notifying the community of a separation. See HERMAN R. LANTZ,
MARITAL INCOMPATIBILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN EARLY AMERICA 15-27 (1976). This
study is valuable primarily because it cautions against equating the rate of marital
incompatibility or dissatisfaction with the divorce rate. Lawrence Stone has studied
separations in England. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530-1987, at
149-228 (1995).
43. One notable exception is the recent passage by Congress of the Defense of
Marriage Act which defines marriage for the purpose of federal law to mean "heterosexual
marriage," and gives states license under the Full Faith and Credit Act not to honor a same-
sex marriage solemnized in another state. Pub. L. No. 104-199 (Sept. 21, 1996), codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) and 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
44. 62 U.S. (1 How.) 582 (1858).
45. Id. at 583-84.
46. Id. at 584.
47. Id.
48. The disabilities of coverture are explained in the text accompanying notes 70-71
infra.
49. Pp. 22, 33. The legal rules of domicile, combined with newfound American
1622 [Vol. 53:1613
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was still married, her domicile was the same as her husband's and she could not
seek to establish diversity jurisdiction; if she was divorced, her order of
separate maintenance could no longer be enforced. The Supreme Court ignored
the technical niceties in that case, awarding Mrs. Barber the unusual status of
being a separated wife with her own domicile.50
But the Court in Barber also announced, albeit in dicta, that domestic
relations matters should be relegated to state courts. Because the particular
claim in Barber-that the Court should enforce an existing order of alimony-
did not qualify as such a matter, the Court was able to exercise jurisdiction.51
That dicta marked the beginning of the so-called "domestic relations exception"
to diversity jurisdiction, which prevents parties from filing petitions for
separation, divorce, or custody in federal court. To this day, although wives
can be domiciled apart from their husbands,52 federal diversity jurisdiction
cannot be established in a domestic relations case.53 Thus the law of marriage
was (and is) relegated to state courts.
State courts do not, however, take on marriage directly. They speak to it,
instead, primarily through cases involving separation. The book begins with a
discussion of McGuire v. McGuire,54 a paradigmatic case in American family
law. Lydia McGuire, a woman who lived in abject poverty due to her
husband's miserliness, sought the assistance of a Nebraska court in enforcing
his duty of support-one of the longstanding duties ascribed to husbands.55
The Court refused her request on the grounds that she and her husband had not
separated. An intact marriage-whether blissful or not-was, for the most part,
a private, law-free zone. 56 Were she separated, the Court undoubtedly would
mobility, caused other problems for married women. Separated wives could only sue for
support where they were domiciled and could only apply for poor relief from their husbands'
settlements. Thus, a woman who was abandoned-and whose domicile followed the
abandoning husband-had to move to his locale in order to make use of these rights. That
was an impossibility for most of them. Pp. 23, 128.
50. Pp. 33-35.
51. Barber, 62 U.S. at 591 (Federal jurisdiction is "limited to cases in which alimony
has been decreed.").
52. See, e.g., O.G.C.A. § 19-2-3 (2000) (The "domicile of a married person shall not be
presumed to be the domicile of that person's spouse."); see also pp. 309-10 ("In the 1970s
and 1980s, legislative drafting offices worked to remove gendered language from the
statutory law of marriage. Domiciles belonged to individuals.").
53. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694-95 (1992) (dicta).
54. 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
55. Id. at 338.
56. Pp. 10-11. The refusal to intervene in an "intact" marriage was not absolute. Early
on, courts stepped in to prevent wives and children from becoming public burdens or to
alleviate moral outrage. Pp. 24-25. Moral outrage might be spurred by physical abuse or
forced prostitution, or any other conduct that thrust "private" discord into the public's view.
P. 25 ("[S]o long as the marital unit did not become a burden on public welfare and so long
as moral failures within the family did not come to public consciousness, for so long the
family would remain private, untouched (but not untouchable) by public power."); see also
ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMEsTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY
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have stepped in, as courts "often recognized the need for remedies in a world
where separated and ex-wives would otherwise find themselves without
support and, often, without the means of earning an adequate living. '57
The reluctance to intervene into existing marriages persists today, though
less absolutely. On the one hand, courts issue restraining orders to stop spousal
abuse, even where the spouses continue to cohabit. 58 On the other hand, courts
categorically refuse to enforce prenuptial agreements that purport to regulate
the day-to-day relationship of a married couple. 59 This abstention reflects
similar concerns about institutional competence to fashion appropriate remedies
and the conflict with family autonomy inherent in doing so. 60
McGuire illustrates the importance of separation to the legal history of
marriage. Suits brought by separated spouses were central to the development
of family law, as courts only had occasion to consider spousal rights and duties
(and whether they had been fulfilled or breached) once a couple had separated.
Those cases provide important insights into the legal expectations forming the
backdrop for typical nineteenth-century marriages.
Separation cases were also important to the development of women's rights
law. Separated wives brought suits to enable them to own property, run
VIoLENcE FROM COLONIAL TIMEs TO THE PRESENT (1987).
57. P. 10.
58. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 842 (McKinney 2001) (distinguishing between two
types of protection orders: "stay away" orders that preclude cohabitation and "do not harass"
orders that permit it).
59. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mathiasen, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1428 (1990) (refusing to
enforce agreement regulating financial support during marriage); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So.
2d 873 (La. 1976) (refusing to enforce agreement limiting sexual intercourse to once a
week); see also James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 935 (2000)
("Courts have to date only infrequently considered-and generally declined to enforce-
prenuptial agreements regulating the parties' behavior during marriage .. "); Laura P.
Graham, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern Social Policy: The
Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1037, 1043 (1993) (explaining that courts refuse to enforce agreements
about an ongoing marriage because to do so "would increase conflict between the parties,
present severe enforcement problems, and frustrate judicial economy"); Judith T. Younger,
Perspectives on Antenuptial Agreements: An Update, 8 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1, 8
(1992). The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act purports to sanction agreements regulating
any aspect of marriage, including "personal rights and obligations." 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987 &
Supp. 1999). But although the Uniform Act has been adopted in half the states, see id. at
369, there is no discernible trend toward greater enforcement of agreements regulating the
ongoing marriage. See Graham, supra, at 1057-63 (suggesting that although courts have
greater justification and authority for enforcing such agreements today, they are not being
regularly enforced). In contrast, agreements regarding the financial consequences of death
or divorce are increasingly likely to be enforced. Prenuptial agreements regulating the post-
marriage relationship do not implicate most of the concerns raised by those regulating an
ongoing marriage.
60. See DiFonzo, supra note 59, at 935; Graham, supra note 59, at 1057. One
exception to this abstention is the law of covenant marriage, see text accompanying notes
252-256 supra, which calls for enforcement of a premarital commitment to seek counseling
prior to obtaining a separation or divorce. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 9:273, 307 (2000).
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businesses, and make contracts-that is, to act like single women. These
rights, eventually codified as married women's property acts in almost every
state, were tremendously important to the progression toward equality for
women.61 Hartog describes them as "institutionally realistic efforts to deal
with the situation of separated wives, who remained otherwise in the law in a
state of coverture, subject to their absent husbands and without the legal
capacity to contract or act in this world."'62 But the rights these acts protected
were first sought-and sometimes obtained-in court by separated wives.
But separation cases are not the only context in which courts enforced
marital duties and rights. Cases involving common law marriage were also
important to understanding the rights and duties of husbands and wives. As
Ariela Dubler points out, the typical common law marriage case in the
nineteenth century involved a woman trying to claim a portion of her deceased
partner's estate. To succeed, she had to prove that she acted like a wife and
should therefore be treated like one for purposes of inheritance. What sufficed
as "wifely behavior" before nineteenth-century courts provides further evidence
about role expectations for nineteenth-century marriage. 63
Criminal law also played a role, particularly during the Progressive Era
when "crimes against morality" filled the statute books. Those laws
criminalized offenses against the family, such as abandonment, neglect,
adultery, and bigamy.64 Where a spouse, typically a husband, was prosecuted
61. Historians disagree about whether married women's property acts were the product
of women's rights advocacy, but not about whether they were important to achieving
women's rights. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRiEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 210 (2d
ed. 1985) ("[T]he real fulcrum of change was outside the family and outside the women's
movement. It lay in the mass ownership of property, in the increased activity of women in
managing property, and in the felt needs of an active land market."); JOAN HOFF, LAW,
GENDER AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 134 (1991) ("Women reformers
were only marginally involved.., in the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts in
the 1830s and 1840s."); Chused, supra note 40, at 1400 (1983) ("Although it is difficult to
argue that lobbying or petitioning by women or their supporters led directly to the passage of
most of the debt statutes, the legal and cultural developments of the first third of the century
certainly created a more sympathetic environment for their enactment."); CoTT, supra note
9, at 52 (stating that the acts "had less to do with concerns for women's rights than with
worries about the economic relations between men and the property interests of male-headed
families"); Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note 12, at 2137 (arguing there is "abundant
evidence that the lobbying and petitioning campaigns of the nineteenth-century woman's
rights movement precipitated the enactment of numerous statutes modifying incidents of
marital status law.").
62. P. 33. See also Chused, supra note 40.
63. See Dubler, supra note 25, at 974-94.
64. Lawrence M. Friedman & Paul Tabor, A Pacific Rim: Crime and Punishment in
Santa Clara County, 1922, 10 LAW & HIST. Ruv. 131, 148 (1992) (describing cases from
criminal docket that involved "crimes against family relations"). Just as it was a crime for
married individuals to pretend they were unmarried, by neglecting their spouses or having
extramarital relationships, it was a crime for unmarried individuals to act married. Dubler,
supra note 25, at 958-59 (discussing prosecution of a couple in 1886 for the crime of acting
married). Many states criminalized offenses such as fornication (sexual relations with an
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for abandonment, the sentence might be an order requiring him to return
home. 65 The crime of spousal neglect might be punished by an order
garnishing the offender's wages to ensure adequate support. Although many of
these prosecutions were never completed,66 the attempt to enforce crimes
against the family is further evidence of customary marital obligations.
C. Aspects of Marriage
1. Transformation and unity.
The conventional legal understanding of nineteenth-century marriage is
primarily a story about the dutiful performance by husbands and wives of
legally prescribed duties in exchange for legally assigned rights. These duties
were embodied in the extremely influential Blackstone's Commentaries on the
law of husband and wife,67 as well as other treatises, 68 and were recited by
courts with schoolboy mimicry.69
Men, for their part, had a duty to support wives and children, a duty to
refrain from immoderate physical and mental abuse, and a duty to remain
sober, faithful, and law-abiding. Women had the right to insist that those duties
be fulfilled. Men also had the right to choose a family religion and domicile.
unmarried partner) and bastardy (fathering a child out of wedlock). See, e.g., Wis. CRiM.
CODE, ch. 351 (1923).
65. This information comes from an empirical study conducted by the author of all
criminal cases in Dane County, Wisconsin, in 1922. The data is on file with the author
[hereinafter Grossman, Dane County Study].
66. See Friedman & Tabor, supra note 64, at 148-49 ("Probably the motive behind
these prosecutions was not punishment, but coercion; these cases were brought to force a
father to support his child. When the screws were turned, he may have submitted, and the
cases were then quietly dropped.").
67. William Blackstone's COMMENTARiES ON THE LAW, first published in 1765, were
edited and republished in each of several generations.
68. See, e.g., KENT, supra note 24; REEVE, supra note 24.
69. See, e.g., Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17 (1883), (reciting the duties of husband and
wife in the context of interpreting a married women's property act).
It was not their purpose, however, to absolve a married woman from the duties which she
owes to her husband, to render him service in his household, to care for him and their
common children with dutiful affection when he or they need her care, and to render all the
services in her household which are commonly expected of a married woman, according to
her station in life. Nor was it the purpose of the statute to absolve her from due obedience
and submission to her husband as head and master of the household, or to depose him from
the headship of his family, which the common law gave him. He still remains liable to
support and protect his wife and responsible to society for the good order and decency of his
household. He is to determine where he and his family shall have a domicile, how his
household shall be regulated and managed, and who shall be members of his family.
Id. at 24. These deeply entrenched rights and duties were also reflected in the laws of
divorce, which made, in many instances, the failure to fulfill marital duties grounds for the
permanent dissolution of marriage. See text accompanying notes 194-206 infra.
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Women, for their part, had a duty to give birth to, nurture, and educate children,
a duty to maintain the home (and hearth), a duty to submit to reasonable sexual
demands, and a commensurate duty to remain sober, faithful, and law-abiding.
Men, in turn, had the right to insist on the performance of these duties.
Married women lacked a unique legal existence; the principle of marital
unity dictated that a man and wife merged into a single entity upon marriage
(namely, the husband). Thus, superimposed over every marriage was also the
law of coverture-the set of rules and disabilities flowing from the principle of
unity.70 A married, or covered, woman lacked the legal capacity to enter into
contracts, to own, sell, or exchange property, to keep any income she earned, to
maintain her own domicile, or to sue and be sued. Coverture had consequences
for husbands, too. Husbands could be sued to recover the cost of necessaries
given to their wives on credit, 71 and they could be held criminally responsible
for certain crimes committed by their wives. Because they were responsible for
their wives' actions, husbands also, at least in theory, had a right of "moderate
correction."
But Hartog uses materials and cases on separation to analyze how the legal
norms embodied in unity and coverture translated into everyday marriages-
whether those formulaic standards affected how ordinary husbands and wives
understood their roles and carried out their marital relationships.
The disabilities of coverture, Hartog argues, were less onerous than
treatises and courts suggested.72 Wife-beating is a good example. Marital
unity was often raised as a defense to a charge of wife-beating, on the theory
that because the husband and wife comprised a single entity the wife-beater
was only beating himself up. In one colorful case, the defendant-husband took
that position, which was pitted against the prosecution's theory that stabbing
one's wife had never been considered suicide.73 Although that case never
resulted in a ruling, since the couple reunited, it is illustrative of a common
refusal by courts to accept unity as a defense to wife-beating. Unity, it was
said, was a principle designed to protect the wife, not the husband, leading the
judge in a fictionalized divorce case to note: "If any ill the wife hath done, The
man is fin'd-for they are one; If any crime the man doth do, Still he is fin'd
for they are two."'74 Likewise, Hartog argues, the common law right of
70. Cf. Corr, supra note 9, at 10 (describing unity as the most important aspect of
marriage in a "broadly shared understanding of the essentials of the institution").
71. The potential for suits by third parties is one possible limitation on the McGuire
principal that the husband's duty of support would not be enforced if the parties were
cohabiting. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
72. Hartog makes an interesting point about the origins of coverture. In English law,
the doctrine was narrow in that it dealt only with ownership of property, not the identities of
husbands and wives, and applied only in royal courts. And, at the time American courts
borrowed it, it was evolving into perhaps an even narrower doctrine. But American courts





husbands to physically correct or chastise their wives for misbehavior was
never fully incorporated into American law.75
Another point of departure from the theoretical principle of unity came in
the context of separate estates. 76 One dictated consequence of coverture was
that a woman's husband automatically assumed control of her premarital
property. It was not uncommon, however, for propertied spouses to enter into
an arrangement to permit the wife to retain a "separate estate."77 Separate
estates first were created exclusively by trust and designed to protect some
money for the wife from her husband's creditors (and his profligacy). A father,
for example, would put money in trust for his daughter, giving a trustee
exclusive control over the property. But by the seventeenth century, trusts
often gave the beneficiary-wives the power to control the assets. And by the
end of the eighteenth century, husbands and wives began to create separate
estates by contract.
Separate estates were anathema to the principles of coverture, yet courts of
equity consistently legitimated them.78 The ad hoc decisions of courts of
equity that allowed women some control over property were codified in waves
by the Married Women's Property Acts, a series of state statutes that formally
lifted the property-related disabilities of coverture. The first wave simply
protected women's premarital property from their husbands' creditors, the same
practice previously sanctioned by courts of equity.79 Later statutes first gave
women the ability to manage and dispose of their property, and gave them
control over their own earnings. 80
75. P. 105; p. 151 (arguing that the right to regulate the household was not an open-
ended or "unquestioned right"). Reva Siegel argues that although the right of chastisement
was repudiated under marital status law, it was ultimately sustained by the doctrine of
marital privacy. Thus, she contends, although nineteenth-century courts did not articulate
wife-beating as a "right," they gave effect to it as such by refusing to interfere in the
relationship between husband and wife. See Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 12, at 2154-
2161.
76. Norma Basch suggests an additional respect in which the strict rules of coverture
were not enforced: "Despite the constraints of coverture, the notion that the gifts or dowry a
wife brought to the marriage should return to her with its dissolution seemed to enjoy broad
currency, even in advance of the married women's property acts." Norma Basch, Relief in
the Premises: Divorce as a Woman's Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815-1870, 8 LAw
& HIST. REv. 1, 9 (1990).
77. P. 172. Only wives who came to the marriage with separate property could benefit
from a separate use or trust agreement. For an interesting history of early marriage
settlements, see LLOYD BONFIELD, MARRIAGE SEIrE'rNTS 1601-1740 (1983).
78. P. 109. Beginning as early as the thirteenth century, a set of parallel rules
developed in courts of equity to relieve women of some of the disadvantages of coverture.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 208 ("[C]ourts of equity had for a long time softened the
husband's dictatorial control, by allowing a father or other relative to establish a separate
estate for the woman, through a premarital settlement or by way of a trust."). See generally
MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 116 (1986).
79. See Chused, supra note 40, at 1398-1400.
80. FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 495-96; see also Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra
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But even as the practical effect of unity was slowly undermined-first
through the protection of courts of equity and later by statute-the concept of
marital unity retained great rhetorical power.
As a symbol of the proper place of a wife within her husband's household and
of her dependency in relation to his rulership, marital unity had a crucial place
in the political culture of early nineteenth century America. It was a fiction
that supported the principle of wifely dependency and thereby helped establish
the terms of republican male citizenship. As a legal concept, however, marital
unity was both protean and weak: unchallenged and ever present, yet of
uncertain significance. 8 1
Why did the pretense of absolute marital unity remain so strong? One
factor, Hartog suggests, may be the efforts of women's rights advocates to paint
a bleak picture to galvanize support for their emerging movement.82 But
effective demonization is only possible where some social reality underlies it.
In many real respects, married women were incomplete and lacked the basic
rights necessary for self-preservation, much less self-fulfillment.
It may be, as Hartog says, that the notion of unity was flexible, and the
disabilities of coverture were less rigid in practice than in theory. He may be
right that husbands did not exercise-or did not believe they could exercise-
the right of moderate correction. 83 But the law on the books nonetheless
mattered. It is that strict law that formed the basis for early rejections of
women's claims to equality. In Bradwell v. Illinois, the Supreme Court refused
to overturn a state law prohibiting women from practicing law.84 As a
constitutional matter, the Court held that the practice of law was not a
traditionally protected right of women. It did not therefore offend the
note 12; Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age
of Emancipation, 75 J. AM. HIST. 471 (1988). Joan Hoff has compiled a useful appendix
cataloguing the adoption of married women's property acts across the country and the
specific rights they granted. See HOFF, supra note 61, at 377-82.
81. P. 110.
82. Pp. 122-23. The first women's rights movement is dated to 1848, when hundreds
of reformers assembled in Seneca Falls, New York, for a convention to address women's
inequality. See Declaration of Sentiments, Seneca Falls Convention, Seneca Falls, New
York (July 1848), in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 70-71 (Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881).
83. P. 105.
84. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a
similar result in In re Goodell, reasoning that the practice of law would be inconsistent with
the "law of nature [which] destines and qualifies the female sex for the bearing and nurture
of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of the world and their
maintenance in love and honor." 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875). The statutes being challenged in
these cases were typical of the era; most states made it difficult, if not impossible, for women
to practice law until well into the twentieth century. Barbara A. Babcock, Feminist Lawyers,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1689, 1695 (1998) (describing women's legal challenges to exclusion from
the practice of law throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades
of the twentieth); see also VIRGINIA DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN
MODERN AMERICAN HIsTORY (1998) (giving a general history of women at the bar).
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Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when Illinois
refused to allow women to engage in it. 85 To reach that result, the majority
relied in part on the legal inability of married women to enter into contracts.8 6
After all, the Court cautioned, what kind of lawyer would a woman be if she
could not enforce contractual fee agreements? 87 Thus, the strict law of
coverture, however emasculated in practice, was used to deny equality to
women outside of the domestic relations context. 88
That case, and others of its ilk, are also important for illustrating the power
of the law of husband and wife. For within that body of law, "the fundamental
contrast" was "not that between men and women but that between single
women and married women .... A single woman's legal status was, for the
most part, indistinguishable from the legal status of many men." 89 And within
the context of domestic relations cases, married women fought to be treated
like single women, which meant, usually, to be treated like men.90
The justification for the Court's refusal in Bradwell to grant women-all
women-eligibility for admission to the state bar, however, did not apply to
single women, as the contractual incapacity afflicted only married women. But
the Court in that case and other courts in the pre-modem era allowed states to
legislate for the general rule, not the exception. As the Wisconsin Supreme
Court explained in In re Goodell:
The cruel chances of life sometimes baffle both sexes, and may leave women
free from the peculiar duties of their sex. These may need employment, and
should be welcome to any not derogatory to their sex and its proprieties, or
inconsistent with the good order of society. But it is public policy to provide
for the sex, not for its superfluous members ... 91
85. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139.
86. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) ('This very incapacity [to make contracts] was
one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed important in rendering a
married woman incompetent fully to perform the duties and trusts that belong to the office of
an attorney and counsellor."); see also Babcock, supra note 84, at 1691-92 (noting that many
courts refused women admission to the bar based in part on the legal disabilities imposed on
married women).
87. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). Even as applied to married
women, Justice Bradley's concern was not entirely warranted. Some states explicitly
permitted a married woman to operate as a "feme sole trader" with consent of her husband.
That status permitted a woman to own a business in her own name, execute binding
contracts, and sue and be sued as if she were single. See SALMON, supra note 78, at 44.
88. Nancy Cott highlights another debilitating consequence of the formal principle of
unity. In 1907, Congress enacted an immigration law, which provided that an American
woman who married a foreign-born man would automatically lose her American citizenship.
CoTr, supra note 9, at 143. Such a wife could only repatriate if her husband was
naturalized. Id. at 143-44. Cott also notes that the Freedmen's Bureau, charged with
transforming ex-slaves into paid workers, institutionalized the formal principles of coverture,
issuing labor contracts that awarded a wife's wages to her husband. lI at 93.
89. P. 118.
90. See text accompanying notes 76-80 supra.
91. 39 Wis. at 245 (emphasis added); see also Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141-42
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Thus, Hartog's claim that "[s]ingle-married, that was the fundamental legal
divide,"92 may be overstated. That distinction was of fundamental importance
in some respects, as evidenced by the insistence of separated women that they
be treated like single women, but unimportant in others. For while the law
treated married women as legally inferior to single ones, it also sometimes, in
adjudging women's claims to equality, treated all women as married. 93
2. Coercion.
Coercion-the existence of and protection from it-played an important
role in the law of nineteenth-century marriage. Hartog makes a convincing
argument that courts flexibly adapted the concept of unity to avoid coercion: In
some instances they strictly enforced it to protect women from undue coercion,
but in others they relaxed it to accomplish the same goal. The offense of
criminal conversation, committed by a man who slept with another man's wife,
is one example. The male lover was considered the offender because he was
presumed to have coerced the other man's wife into the relationship; the wife's
legal identity, and thus her capacity to consent, was not recognized. 94 Here, the
principle of unity was strictly enforced. On the other hand, men who sought to
sell property otherwise subject to dower interests were seldom taken at their
word that their wives had consented to the sale.95 The court instead would
subject the wife to a "separate examination" to see whether she voluntarily
waived her interest in the property. Her legal identity there was recognized
because it was necessary to illuminate the husband's presumed coercion. 96
(Bradley, J., concurring) ("[Although] many women are unmarried and not affected by any
of the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married state," the "rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases."). Modem equal protection jurisprudence prohibits sexually
discriminatory laws that are based on generalizations-even if largely true-about women.
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550-51 (1996) (suggesting the Virginia
Military Institute's male-only admissions policy would violate the equal protection clause
even if only a single woman could succeed in the program). Laws that regulated all women
based on a disability peculiar to wives would thus not survive.
92. P. 93.
93. Nancy Cott also notes the tendency to treat all women as wives in the context of
citizenship. "Congressmen tended to slip easily between standards about 'women' and
'wives' with regard to citizenship. The wife's enforced civic dependency influenced their
views of all women, who were potential wives." Corr, supra note 9, at 96.
94. P. 137.
95. Dower gave a wife a one-third life interest in the real property of her husband at his
death. The right of dower attached to his property at the time of marriage or any subsequent
acquisition of property, and thus property could not be sold without the wife's voluntary
waiver. P. 145.
96. P. 146; see also In re Williams' Estate, 102 Cal. 70, 80-81 (1894) ("[T]he object of
the [adoption] statute in directing the judge to make a separate examination of the parties,
was for the protection of a wife, or child over the age of twelve years, whose consent is made
essential to the creation of the contract, by guarding them in some degree from the possible
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The law's treatment of separate estates, described above, 97 is another
example of a systemic tendency to protect wives from husbandly coercion.
Initially, separate estates created by trust were presumed to lodge all
managerial power in the trustees whether or not the instrument included such a
restriction, 98 leaving women powerless to dispose of the property. But later,
courts adopted the opposite presumption: wives could control their separate
estates unless the trust instrument expressly precluded it.99
The more legal control women had over their premarital property,
however, the more vulnerable they were to coercion by their husbands, who
could force a perfectly legal conveyance from husband to wife. In 1817,
Chancellor Kent tried to build a wall against that coercion by holding that
wives could not convey property held in a separate estate to their husbands.100
"Separate estates existed because of the structural reality of marital
coercion," 101 Hartog contends, and this interpretation shored up their protective
capacity. Kent's interpretation did not prevail, 102 though the equitable
recognition of separate use agreements did. The end result was an uncertain
victory for wives: They could retain separate estates, but the law permitted
them to make conveyances to their husbands. Legal rights were in some cases
the vehicle for perpetrating oppression of wives by their husbands. 103
Hartog's narrative of Harriet Douglas Cruger illustrates the practical effect
of this new interpretation. Harriet, a rich woman with ideas far ahead of her
time, 104 retained control over her significant wealth through a marriage
settlement agreement. Her marriage deteriorated and eventually, to stave off
litigation, she executed a document giving her husband half the income from
her trust assets. She later claimed that she was coerced by her husband and a
cadre of his advisors into executing it. But her claim of coercion was
unsuccessful. The court recognized the marriage settlement (which allowed her
to keep her wealth in her own name), but refused to invalidate the assignment
(which upheld her conveyance of one-half to her husband) despite her
coercive influence of the husband or parent, and also to enable the judge to ascertain whether
the consent of such persons was entirely free.").
97. See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
98. See SALMON, supra note 78, at 116.
99. See id.




103. This is perhaps an example of what Reva Siegel terms "preservation through
transformation," when an apparent move toward equality perpetuates the inequality through
other means. See Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 12, at 2119.
104. For example, she stated that any man she might marry would have to take her
name, give up his profession, live where she wished to live, and permit her to retain full




allegation of coercion. 105 What the court gave with one hand, it took away
with the other.
Separate estates were eventually recognized by the married women's
property acts as a legal (as opposed to equitable) device, available even without
a separate use or trust agreement.106 But as wives gained legal rights over
property, concerns about coercion reappeared. 10 7
Courts' flexible reliance on the concept of unity was not the only
protection for women against marital coercion. In some respects, Hartog
argues, the principles of coverture actually protected women by preventing men
from exercising undue coercion over them. 10 8 Because husbands' rights were
so clearly established by the doctrine, he contends, they did not need to resort
to violence to exact obedience. 109 This argument is not terribly convincing.
But perhaps the availability of divorce on grounds of cruelty, more so as
the nineteenth century progressed, provided some concrete limits on the
husband's "right" to control his wife. The grounds for divorce-on the books
and in practice-delineated between acceptable control, which the law might
have permitted, and cruelty or abuse, which it forbade. By 1886, nearly four-
fifths of the states permitted absolute divorce on the basis of cruelty. 110 And
many courts by that time had granted divorces on that ground based on
emotional or mental, rather than physical, cruelty.111
In the Alameda County study of divorce records at the end of the
nineteenth century, cruelty played some role in limiting the husband's power to
105. Pp. 176-86.
106. P. 176. See also Chused, supra note 40; Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 12;
Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note 12.
107. P. 187.
108. P. 168.
109. Hartog's interpretation of coverture's impact on women stands in stark contrast to
Reva Siegel's. For Siegel, not only did coverture have a predictably oppressive impact on
women, but so did the principles that replaced it. See Siegel, Marital Status Law, supra note
12; Siegel, Home as Work, supra note 12. Nancy Cott agrees that the Married Women's
Property Acts, which lifted many of the disabilities of coverture, were "implemented
conservatively." CoT, supra note 9, at 53.
110. CARROLL D. WRIGHT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, A REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1886, at 89-113 (1908). Some states required that the
cruelty be severe enough to endanger the victim-spouse's life, but most gave only a general
standard like "extreme cruelty" or "cruel or barbarous treatment." Id.
111. See BASCH, supra note 21, at 61 ("Physical cruelty was a ground [for divorce] that
renegotiated the terms on which women contracted marriage .... "); MARY ANN GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 63 (1987) (" '[Cruelty' came to encompass
mental cruelty in the divorce courts."); GRIswOLD, supra note 18, at 18-20 (summarizing
California appellate opinions interpreting cruelty to include aspersions of character and other
types of mental abuse); Jane Turner Censer, "Smiling Through Her Tears": Ante-Bellum
Southern Women and Divorce, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 24, 28-29 (1981) (noting that several




control the household. 112 Thirty-five percent of divorce plaintiffs cited cruelty
as the primary ground for divorce, 113 and most of those were women. 114 But
what is important to the question of male power within a marriage is not only
the number of petitions, but also the conduct cited in those complaints.
These records suggest, at the very least, that the ground of cruelty was used
to remedy gross physical and mental abuse. Through their allegations of
cruelty, wives objected to physical and mental abuse, sexual excessiveness and
brutality, starvation and neglect, and abandonment. In contrast, husbands who
claimed "cruelty" complained of wives who slept with other men, prostituted
themselves, or neglected to cook, clean, or care for children.115
Physical abuse was the largest subcategory of cruelty cases. Twenty
percent of female cruelty plaintiffs alleged real, physical injury. 116 Courts were
receptive to these claims, denying not a single one in the Alameda County
study. Most of the plaintiffs alleged unprovoked, violence at the hands of their
spouses; often the incidents complained of were severe enough to warrant
criminal action. H.G. Williams, for example, was arrested for beating his wife
when she left to take a bike ride without his permission: "he beat her cruelly,
pulled her by the hair, nearly closed her left eye, caught her by the throat and
112. Some statutes explicitly framed cruelty as a remedy for women. Censer, supra
note 111, at 27; see also BASCH, supra note 21, at 61 (discussing the ground of cruelty as a
factor in the nineteenth-century gender realignment); GROSSBERG, supra note 25, at 232-34
(discussing the role of mental cruelty as a grounds for divorce in the power struggle between
men and women).
113. Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13. Although cruelty
was a popular ground on which to sue, plaintiffs experienced a considerably lower success
rate (78%) than with other grounds (86%). But the disparity is explained primarily by
voluntary dismissals by the parties, rather than denials by the court (18% versus 11%
overall). Id. This may suggest that cruelty was used as a tool to coerce reform rather than to
secure a divorce.
114. Eighty-six percent of the cruelty plaintiffs were women. IdL The Alameda
County data suggest that cruelty was more common among couples in lower socioeconomic
classes. A higher percentage of families involved in these cases practiced unskilled trades
and worked as common laborers and a correspondingly lower percentage worked at skilled
trades or fell into the category "middle class." Id
115. Conrad Van Meter complained that his wife "commonly allowed the dwelling
house... to be and remain in a dirty condition... the kitchen was at all times especially
dirty, refuse matter being allowed to stand therein until the air of the room was foul,
offensive to the smell, and unhealthy to breathe." She also "seldom served the family meals
at the proper time... [and they] were commonly so badly cooked and poorly served as to
endanger plaintiff's health." Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13,
Docket No. 19408.
116. There is reason to be cautious in analyzing the allegations in divorce petitions
because of the problem of collusion. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra; see also
Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 79 ("As demand for divorce rose, the grounds
alleged for divorce changed; they corresponded less and less with the real or underlying
causes.") But even if these cases do not tell us what in fact occurred between husbands and
wives, they reveal the norms being applied to evaluate marital misconduct. This, in turn,




threw her down and kneeled on her chest while he beat her." She sought and
obtained a divorce.1 17
Another eighteen percent of female cruelty plaintiffs alleged emotional
cruelty. Louisa Higgins, for example, was married to a "very bad man,
unworthy of the woman who called him husband." 118 Louisa testified that
Edward would
wreck my feelings with his cold words. While he would not use profane language
he would hurt me with his coldness. I remember when I was ill in New York. It
was very cold and I had a very high fever. The doctor wanted me removed to a
room where there was a fire and my husband replied: 'If she has to die she might
just as well die here as anywhere.' 1 19
This cruelty was sufficient to earn Louisa a divorce. Other wives alleged a
range of conduct, from throwing the contents of a chamber pot in one wife's
face 120 to insulting a woman's friend by refusing to eat dinner with "such god
damned company about her." 12 1
A substantial number of women's complaints dealt with sexual cruelty.
Mary Thornton brought a typical suit, complaining that her husband "engaged
in a course of sexual brutaiity." 12 2 "He is a man of violent passion and he
wanted sexual intercourse every night, and sometimes two or three times a
night," she testified, "and he would become very violent and cross, when I
wouldn't gratify his desires, and call me names. 123 His retort when she would
not submit was, ironically, to call her a whore. Women also objected to the
infliction of venereal disease 124 and forced prostitution. 125
117. Wife Beaten by Husband: She Took a Bike Ride Without Permission and Was
Brutally Beaten, OAKLAND TRm., Apr. 26, 1900, at 1. A precursor to the burning bed, some
women took the law in their own hands rather than appealing to a divorce court. Mrs.
Charles Adams was such a woman; she murdered her husband on account of the extreme
brutality shown to her and her children. Brutal Husband Killed, OAKLAND TRm., Mar. 16,
1900, at 1.
118. Coldness is Cruelty: A Husband Who Treated His Wife With Utter Unconcern,
OAKLAND DAiLY EvENiNG TRIB., Feb. 13, 1890, at 1.
119. Id.
120. Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13, Docket No. 11858.
121. Id., Docket No. 20376.
122. Id., Docket No. 17278.
123. Id. Mary also claimed that she was once sick in bed pursuant to doctor's orders
when her husband came in the room, swore and cursed, and screamed that she was not ill,
"but was only shamming, playing lazy." Id.
124. For example, Theresa Spier sued for divorce because her husband associated with
"lewd and dissolute women," and became "infected with a disgusting, highly infectious,
venereal disease and well knowing that he was so affected, and without giving plaintiff any
notice or information of his condition, had marital intercourse with her whereby [she]
became affected." Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13, Docket No.
11002.
125. Edith Baldwin filed for divorce upon discovering that her husband had forced her
to take a waitressing job for which she was required to "allow said male patrons to sleep
with her.., and to commit adultery with her.., or else cease to be an employee of the
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The sexual cruelty cases illustrate an important limitation on male behavior
in marriage; 126 though men were entitled to sexual relations as part of the
marriage contract, this right was limited both by a woman's health and some
notion of excessiveness. 127
Women also sought and obtained "cruelty" divorces based on
maltreatment. Eighteen of the 231 cruelty plaintiffs sought divorce because
they were locked in, forced out, overworked, or taken somewhere far from
home and abandoned. 128 The remaining female cruelty plaintiffs complained
of husbands who falsely accused them of engaging in adultery or
prostitution, 129 who maliciously destroyed personal property, 130 or who
threatened them with physical harm.131 These cruelty claims, which were
restaurant." kd, Docket No. 18950.
126. See PLECK, supra note 56, at 89-94 (discussing role of sexual brutality in divorce).
The right to resist sex, particularly given the physical danger to women posed by both
childbirth and venereal disease, was part of the women's rights platform in the middle of the
nineteenth century. See COrr, supra note 9, at 67; see also PLECK supra note 56, at 90-91
(noting the belief of some feminists that "[d]ivorce was the sole remedy" for a "loveless
marriage and a union in which the husband forced his wife to submit to sex").
127. The standard for excessiveness was quite high. Most claims of this type alleged
that the husband attempted or required sex upwards of three times a day. Many women
brought in doctors as expert witnesses, despite the infrequency with which experts were used
in divorce cases, to testify about the resulting physical and emotional harm. Anna Caruth,
for example, called her family physician to the stand to explain the impact of her wedding
night, on which her husband "approached [her] five times, had connection five times," all
against her will. He also forced her to assume many different positions, while assuring her
that "he never loved her and never would." Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study,
supra note 13, Docket No. 14190. His sexual demands were too great for the small woman,
the doctor testified, and consequently, "made the parts very swollen and inflamed," and
caused her "sickness and nervous prostration." Id.
128. A pregnant Margaret Sinkwitz complained that her husband took her on a
camping trip and left her 15 miles from home, Id., Docket No. 18923, while Mrs. Cummings
sought a divorce from her husband on cruelty grounds because he "used to arise early in the
morning and bum old rags in order to smoke her out of the house." Smoked Her Out:
Cummings' Plan to Get His Wife Out of Bed, OAKLAND DAILY EVENING TRm., July 5, 1890,
at 1.
129. After William Allen's wife, Meda, went to the drugstore to buy little bath rags, he
demanded to know "where in the hell" she got those "cock rags;" "those are what they use in
whore houses," he yelled knowingly, and "nothing but fast women have those in .their
possession." Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13, Docket No.
14363.
130. Louisa Engel reached her limit when her husband insisted on throwing soup,
chicken, water and her sewing machine in the yard. He promised to reform, but Louisa
"couldn't trust him anymore. He [had] promised too often and never kept his promises."
Id., Docket No. 13522. Her request for divorce was granted.
131. Thirteen percent of female cruelty plaintiffs based their complaint solely on
threats of physical violence; only one of these thirty plaintiffs was denied her sought-after
divorce. Harriet Leonard alleged that her husband warned her that "there was one nigger
woman in West Oakland that got filled with hot lead, and if you don't get out of here quick,
I'll fill you full of hot lead," leading Harriet's dentist to refuse "to work on her teeth because
she was so nervous." Id., Docket No. 23758.
1636 [Vol. 53:1613
SEPARATED SPOUSES
almost always successful, played a role in limiting the extent of husbandly
control. 132
3. Uniformity.
Another important aspect of Hartog's depiction of nineteenth-century
marriage is its uniformity. Hartog's research provides further support for the
contention that marriage in the nineteenth century was primarily a status
relationship-a social institution that was appropriately subject to state
standardization and regulation. 133 That changed through the course of the
twentieth century, through "the gradual substitution of individuals' choices
concerning the nature, duration, the terms of their relationships, for
standardized formulas imposed by the state." 134
But in the nineteenth century marriage was theoretically and legally a
uniform status-all husbands had the same rights and duties prescribed by law,
all wives were entitled to the same reciprocal rights and duties. 135 Of course,
.not every couple adhered to these prescribed roles behind closed doors, but
courts did not permit them to be formally altered. 136 Couples who attempted to
alter the terms of their own marriages met with resounding disapproval. 137
132. My interpretation of the Alameda County cruelty cases as establishing a fairly
lenient standard stands in some tension with Reva Siegel's analysis of Massachusetts divorce
law. Based on appellate cases, she concludes that the cruelty standard was strict, "premised
on the assumption that a wife was obliged to endure various kinds of violence as a normal-
and sometimes deserved-part of married life." Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 12, at 2134.
133. Lord Mansfield's contractual view of marriage, circa 1783, was a short-lived
exception to this characterization. Pp. 77-83; see also CoTr, supra note 9, at 11 ('The man
and woman consented to marry, but public authorities set the terms of the marriage, so that it
brought predictable rewards and duties.").
134. Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change. A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce,
1983 Wis. L. Rnv. 789, 796; see also DiFonzo, supra note 59 (describing increasing
customization of marriage); Hartog, supra note 6, at 95-96 ("There are [today] as many types
of marriages as there are married couples, each one the product of the distinctive choices and
investments of its partners."); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW
PROPERTY 107 (1981); Michael Grossberg, Guarding the Altar: Physiological Restrictions
and the Rise of State Intervention in Matrimony, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 197 (1982). On the
twentieth-century shift from state regulation toward private ordering in family relations, see
generally Naomi Cahn, Looking at Marriage, 98 MicH. L. REv. 1766, 1770 (2000) (noting
the "shift from state intervention and state-imposed norms toward more private
decisionmaking"); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv.
1443, 1444 (noting the "preference for private over public ordering" in modem family law
doctrines and procedures).
135. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
136. See Con, supra note 9, at 102 ("[C]ourts emphasized that the marital bargain,
although entered by consent, could not be changed, modified, or ended thereby ....").
137. Though many couples may have tried to alter the standard terms of marriage
privately, few renounced them openly enough to engender public disapproval. But Lucy
Stone and Henry Blackwell were a notable exception. On their wedding day, Stone and
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Hartog draws on the sometimes complicated history of separate
maintenance agreements to illustrate this point. Many couples parting ways
entered into separation or separate maintenance agreements. 138  These
agreements were designed to mimic a formal separation, by dividing property
and children between a husband and wife that intended to live apart, without
invoking any legal process for ending the malniage. 139 Typical provisions of an
agreement might be that a husband would no longer be responsible for his
wife's support, that the wife would have the right to keep her own earnings, or
that the wife would have custody of the children. The upshot of such
provisions, if enforceable, would be to sanction either a marriage that did not
conform to the law's expectations-for the informally separated were still
legally married-or a separation without grounds. Neither was acceptable.
Against a backdrop of early law of husband and wife, Hartog identifies two
obstacles to the enforcement of separate maintenance agreements. First was the
notion that marriage, though individually carried out by private parties, was a
public institution, granted and regulated by the state. 140 The rights and
obligations imposed by that institution were immutable, not subject to
individual adaptation. 141 Second was the fact that under the principles of
coverture a married man and woman were part of a single, legal entity.
Allowing husband and wife to enter into a contract would have the technical
effect of sanctioning a contract made between a man and himself.142
The problem of unity could be cured through the use of a trustee-thus
avoiding, at least in form, a contract between husband and wife. 143 Post-
nuptial trusts, which had the effect of giving a separated wife control over her
share of the divided property, were routinely enforced by courts of equity. 144
Blackwell executed a "marriage protest," rejecting the Blackstonian marriage in favor of a
more egalitarian partnership. See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint
Venture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the
Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. RPv. 2017, 2021-22 (2000); COTT, supra note 9, at 64. Stone
also rejected the convention that a wife assume her husband's surname. See Omi, The
Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDozo WOMEN's L.J. 321, 387 (1998). Although her
renunciation of that tradition was the inspiration for generations of feminists fighting for the
right of married women to keep their own names, it was largely disapproved of by her
contemporaries. Organizers of an 1856 Woman's Rights Convention insisted that she appear
under the name "Lucy Stone Blackwell." Id at 398 n.444.
138. These are different from separate estates, which protect a wife's premarital wealth





143. See STONE, supra note 42, at 150 (discussing the prevalence of private separation
deeds between a husband and a trustee for his wife, because the wife had no separate legal
identity). The trust was the device used to create separate estates during marriage as well.
See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
144. SALMON, supra note 78, at 58-59.
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But common law courts generally refused to enforce what was, in substance, a
contract between husband and wife, even if the presence of a trustee removed
the technical obstacle. 145
The enforceability of such agreements outside of courts of equity was the
subject of high-level debate between two important English jurists, Lords
Mansfield and Kenyon. 146 Ironically, the high water mark of the enforceability
of separation agreements came in the late 1700s, when Lord Mansfield took a
contractual view of marriage and recognized that husbands and wives could
change the terms of their relationship under certain circumstances. 147 But his
successor, Lord Kenyon, rejected that view in Marshall v. Rutton and declared
such contracts to be illegal.148 It was that view that carried the day-and the
next century. Marriages were controlled by law, not spouses.
Common law marriage may pose a challenge to Hartog's claim that
marriage was a rigidly uniform structure in the nineteenth century. Common
law marriages were valid in most states, 149 allowing couples to contractually
create a marriage, without bowing to the government's dictated formality. 150
Once formed, a common law marriage could be used as a basis for claims of
inheritance and support. But for the most part, marriage was a uniform
relationship, whose terms were dictated by the state rather than the participants.
II. STATUS TWO: MARRIED (BUT LIVING APART)
Separation was a fact of life in nineteenth-century America. Separations
came about for myriad reasons, some unrelated to marital happiness. Some
started "with the search for work, for land, for gold, for economic security, for
freedom, for escape from a stultifying social environment, religious conflict,
warfare." 151 Other separations were the product of marital discord, leading one
145. Id. at 59. Not surprisingly, the strictness of a state's divorce law was inversely
related to its willingness to enforce separate maintenance agreements. A liberal divorce law
gave women who were in fact living apart from their husbands a way to obtain the legal
status necessary to function independently-by getting a divorce. There was, therefore, no
pressure on the law to recognize separate maintenance agreements or sole trader rights for
women who, although formally married, were nonetheless trying to function independently.
But where divorce was harder to obtain, separation agreements "served a vital social
function." Id. at 71.
146. Pp. 77-86. Though the technical problems of marital unity and the immutability
of marital obligations may have occupied the discussion, the chimera of giving couples a
right to separation, where the codified law did not, was clearly lurking. See text
accompanying notes 153-159 infra.
147. P. 78.
148. Id. (citing Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T.R. 545 (K.B. 1800)); see also STONE, supra
note 42, at 154-56 (describing the conservative reaction to Lord Mansfield's approach).
149. See note 8 supra.
150. See Dubler, supra note 8, at 1896 (noting the "diversity of relations" nineteenth-
century judges had to confront).
151. P. 30. As Norma Basch posits, "men found anonymity in the expanding national
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spouse to leave town in order to avoid the stigma of an unlawful separation, to
find a state more amenable to divorce, or to enter a bigamous remarriage
without being caught.152
Yet separation as a legal status has received scant attention in the
substantial literature on marriage and marital stability. Hartog lays the
groundwork for a refocused debate about marital instability and marital exits,
posing some important questions for future research. Determining why couples
separated rather than divorced and why couples separated informally is a good
place to begin that project.
A. The Legal Right to Separate
Throughout the nineteenth century, states provided some mechanism for
couples to obtain a court-approved separation. Such a separation-sometimes
also called a divorce from bed and board, a divorce a mensa et thoro, or a
limited divorce-was similar in many respects to divorce. 153 Couples had a
right of separation in only certain, narrowly defined circumstances. Typical
grounds for separation included cruelty or endangerment, neglect, desertion,
and intemperance. 154 Spouses who found themselves in immediate physical
danger generally had adequate grounds for a legal separation. 155 Separation
statutes typically gave courts the authority to divide property, 156 order payment
of alimony,157 and award custody. 158 The only meaningful difference between
separation and divorce was that the former deprived the couple of the right of
remarriage. 159
landscape .... Simply stated, there were more places to go and more ways to get there."
Basch, supra note 76, at 16.
152. Pp. 31-32. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Crimes of Mobility, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 637, 642 (1991) (describing two types of nineteenth-century bigamists, one of whom
was "a man who found his first marriage unsatisfying or stifling; he decamped, without the
bother of a divorce, and started over again, usually in some other city").
153. P. 36. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 204.
154. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. V, § 12 (1871) (cruelty and neglect); MAss. GEN.
STAT. ch. 107, § 9 (1860) (cruelty, desertion, intoxication, and neglect); MICH. GEN. STAT.
ch. 237 § 6229 (1883) (cruelty, desertion, and neglect); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 51 (Gould
1852) (cruelty, unsafe conduct, and neglect).
155. English law, which permitted no judicial divorce until 1857, provided for a
separation in the case of conduct endangering life or limb. See GEORGE ELLIOTT HOWARD, 3
HISTORY Or MATRIMONIAL INsTITuToNs 52-54, 93-97 (1904).
156. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. V, § 13 (1871); MICH. GEN. STAT. ch. 237 § 6241
(1883).
157. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 57 (Gould 1852).
158. See, e.g., MICH. GEN. STAT. ch. 237 § 6238 (1883); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 57
(Gould 1852).
159. Cf. ME. REv. STAT. tit. V, § 2 (1871) (either party to a divorce may marry again).
The right of remarriage was not absolute following divorce, however. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 61 (Deering 1899) (imposing a one-year waiting period between divorce and
remarriage); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 53 (Gould 1852) (depriving adultery defendant of right
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Most states made it easier to obtain a separation than a divorce. 160 In
Massachusetts, for example, an absolute divorce could be granted on grounds
of adultery, impotency, desertion, or felony conviction, 161 while a limited
divorce could be granted on the broader grounds of extreme cruelty,
intemperance, or willful neglect. 162
Despite the law's disdain for de facto separation, reflected not only in the
statutory law that limited its availability, but also in the rhetoric of courts and
treatise writers who vigorously denounced it,163 formal, legalized separations
occupied only a small proportion of the total. How small we do not know
because informal separations, which had no official legal status, were not
tracked in any meaningful way. 164 And legal historians have perhaps
underemphasized it for that same reason. 165
The prevalence of informal, and therefore unlawful, separations showed a
real limitation of the power of law. There was, in fact, almost nothing courts
to remarry during life of the plaintiff).
160. Even today, with no-fault divorce, states still provide for legal separation. See,
e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-904(a) (1966) (permitting a decree of separation from bed and board
based on adultery, cruelty, or living apart). Those statutes serve couples who want to retain
the option of reuniting, or, for other reasons, are unable or unwilling to get an absolute
divorce. New York, for example, requires a formal separation as a precondition to divorce
unless fault grounds are alleged. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2001)
(requiring that couples be separated for one year pursuant to either a legal decree of
separation or a written separation agreement before filing for divorce).
161. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 107, §§ 6, 7 (1860). A divorce could also be awarded
to a party whose spouse joined a religious sect that did not believe in marriage, namely the
Shakers. See id.
162. See MASS. GEN. STAT. ch. 107, § 9 (1860). The claim of willful neglect was, in
most states, explicitly reserved to wives. See, e.g., MICH. REv. STAT. tit. 7, ch. 2, § 4 (1838)
(providing for limited divorce "on the application of the wife, when the husband, being of
sufficient ability to provide a suitable maintenance for her, shall grossly or wantonly and
cruelly refuse or neglect so to do"). In Maryland, women alleging cruelty, desertion, or
neglect were most successful in obtaining decrees of separation. See SALMON, supra note
78, at 63.
163. P. 29 ("Judges and treatise writers inherited from eighteenth-century English law
a stock set of pejorative phrases about separation."); P. 271 ("Separation existed as the dark
underbelly of the received law of marriage.").
164. P. 32. Although there are far more statistics available for marriage and divorce
than separation, even those numbers are inadequate. It was not until the twentieth century
that most states began to keep accurate records of marriages and divorces. See Friedman &
Percival, supra note 36, at 68 (cataloguing available statistics).
165. There are some exceptions to this generalization. Lawrence Stone focuses on
separation in England during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. See
STONE, supra note 42, at 149-228. Carl Degler mentions separations in his attempt to assess
marital stability in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS:
WOMEN AND THE FAvILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO T=E PRESENT 165-66
(1980). Marylynn Salmon talks about separation in her treatment of women's property
rights. See SALMON, supra note 78, at 58, 71. Of course, non-legal American history,
particularly frontier history, deals quite extensively with the incidents of mobility, like
separation.
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could do to prevent a truly mutual separation. Unilateral separation could be
punished or cured by a criminal conviction for abandonment, 166 or a divorce
granted to the innocent party on the same grounds. 167 But a truly consensual
separation was beyond the law's reach. Courts could not generally compel a
couple to live together (particularly if neither party brought it to their attention),
nor could they force couples to get a divorce. 168 As Hartog concludes: "By the
1840s, perhaps earlier, separating had become an exercise of unchallengeable
private freedom." 169
B. Separation Versus Divorce
That nineteenth-century couples did separate is convincingly established by
Hartog and others, but why they chose separation over divorce is more
complicated. One of Hartog's truly important insights is that, for many
nineteenth-century couples, separation was neither a stepping stone to divorce,
nor simply a fallback option when divorce was not available. 170 Separation in
the nineteenth century, he contends, constituted an entirely unique status,
sought by many couples as an end in itself. The ideal of permanence was
important to couples, and separation permitted marriage to remain an
unalterable, lifetime status.
1. Abigail and Asa Bailey.
Separation allowed a couple to stay married without continuing to live in
conflict, and a wife to achieve self-preservation, though not self-fulfillment.
Abigail Bailey, a New Hampshire wife, presents the paradigmatic case. Hartog
devotes a chapter to her marriage, separation, and eventual divorce. 171 Her
husband, Asa Bailey, was a "violent and hard man who, after twenty years of
166. Friedman & Tabor, supra note 64, at 148-49 (describing cases from criminal
docket that involved "crimes against family relations"); Grossman, Dane County Study,
supra note 65.
167. See, e.g., Paula Petrik, Send the Bird and Cage: The Development of Divorce Law
in Wyoming, 1868-1900, 6 W. LEGAL HST. 153, 155 (1993) (finding that two-thirds of all
divorces recorded in one Wyoming county between 1869 and 1900 were premised on
desertion, typically by men); see also Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra
note 13 (finding that desertion was the most common ground for divorce in Alameda County




170. Although Hartog occasionally speaks of separation as a divorce substitute, see, for
example, p. 29 ("When unhappy nineteenth-century couples lacked the legal grounds or the
financial means or the moral or religious support to seek a divorce, many separated."), his
central premise is to the contrary.
171. For a discussion of the value of relying on exceptional cases, see text
accompanying notes 21, 25 supra.
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marriage and the birth of fourteen children, sexually abused one of their
daughters."'172 Abigail's struggle to renegotiate her self and her marriage,
without running afoul of her Christian beliefs and her conventional views about
marriage and its permanence, reveals volumes about the function of separation
in that era.
For years after Abigail discovered her husband's misconduct, she did not
avail herself of legal rights to a divorce, a formal separation, or even a criminal
prosecution. 17 3 But eventually she changed course, deciding to take steps to
stop his "'abominable wickedness and cruelties."' 174 He ardently resisted a
formal separation, reminding her that the law said she must submit to his
control and authority. But she understood his right to power as dependent upon
his marital duties, which he had breached. 175 He eventually elected to leave
town "forever" rather than be haled into court. 176 But his exit was temporary,
lasting only five weeks.
The rest of their relationship was marked by Asa's alternating pleas for
forgiveness and attempts to stifle Abigail's efforts to obtain a formal separation
and property division. He used his sole right of custody to threaten her with the
loss of her children, 17 7 his right of domination to order her submission, and her
reliance on his financial support to threaten her with starvation. 178 Ultimately,
172. P. 40. Abigail's story is collected primarily from her posthumously published
memoirs. See id.
173. P. 41. Women in most states had some legal protection against spousal abuse.
See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTNG AsUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY




177. Pp. 51-52, 60. Until the end of the nineteenth century, women had no custody or
guardianship rights to children. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Joanna L. Grossman & Chris
Guthrie, Guardians: A Research Note, 40 AM. J. LEG. HST. 146, 152-53 (1996); see also
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 196 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1892) ("A mother is
only entitled to reverance and respect."); GROSSBERG, supra note 8, at 234-37; MARY ANN
MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF CHILD
CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (1994). Men could lose custody rights, but only
following a finding of unfitness. When both parents were "fit," there was no comparative
evaluation of the relative merits of the mother over the father where they had separated. P.
201. But see Censer, supra note 111, at 43-45 (suggesting that southern appellate judges in
the ante-bellum period were inclined to award custody to women if they could prove
superiority over their husbands). Even where women had been widowed, they had to seek
court approval to become guardians of their children. See MASON, supra, at 65-66 (noting
that a widowed mother, "now a widow femme sole, had no more rights to her children then
when she wasfemme couvert"). Inequity with respect to guardianship rights was one of the
practices identified in the Declaration of Sentiments, a list of the most significant aspects of
women's oppression produced at the first women's rights convention in Seneca Falls, New
York, in 1848. See Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 82.
178. Because of the common law duty of support, most merchants would permit wives
to purchase necessaries on their husbands' credit. Asa threatened to post notices alerting
local merchants that she should not be allowed to purchase anything on his credit, a common
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Abigail sought and received a decree of divorce based on Asa's felony of
incest. 179
For Abigail, a separation was necessary to her self-preservation. From a
religious standpoint, she worried about the effect of being linked with such an
evil man on her hope for salvation. 180 From a community standpoint, she was
troubled by the stigma that might mark her family because of Asa's conduct. 181
From a legal standpoint, her continuing to live with him would constitute
condonation, and thereby deprive her of the right to a divorce. 182 Divorce
became necessary when separation, because of Asa's failure to abide by their
agreement and Abigail's fear of losing her children, failed to serve her desire
for self-preservation.183
Although Abigail and Asa's separation turned out, in hindsight, to be a
transition to their ultimate divorce, that was neither's original intention.
"Abigail Bailey worked to separate herself from her husband, not to be
divorced. That the story ends with her divorce is perhaps an accidental
conclusion to the narrative." 184  They preferred separation because they
perceived it to be less public, more accessible, and less an affront to their
religious beliefs and social reputation. Separation would have enabled them to
stay married, but live apart. Hartog suggests that the Baileys were not unusual
in their preference for separation over divorce. Whether divorce was legally
available, what extralegal constraints might have made it undesirable, and the
economic and non-economic consequences of obtaining one are important to
understanding why couples might have elected to separate rather than divorce.
2. The legal availability of divorce.
The early history of American divorce is by now a familiar story.185 Prior
to the Revolutionary War, divorce was rare and highly restricted. England, in
practice for husbands in the midst of a separation, divorce, or other marital conflict. P. 50.
Cf STONE, supra note 42, at 161 (noting that in England, for a "private separation document
to be legally enforceable ... the husband was also expected publicly to warn shop-keepers in





182. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
183. P. 53-54.
184. P. 52.
185. There is a substantial literature on the history of divorce. See BASCH, supra note
21; NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES (1977); RICHARD H. CHUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF DIVORCE IN THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1994); DEGLER, supra note
165; DIFoNzo, supra note 36; MARY ANN GLENDON, supra note 111; GRISWOLD, supra note
18; LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES
(1980); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
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fact, had no judicial divorce until 1857.186 South Carolina remained
divorceless after Independence, though other southern states granted limited
access to divorce.187 Legislatures in northern states sometimes enacted private
bills granting a divorce to a single couple, who, in the opinion of the legislators,
deserved one.188 The practice of legislative divorce gradually gave way in the
mid-nineteenth century to general statutes providing for judicial-or
courtroom---divorce. 189
The obsolescence of legislative divorce was effected as a practical matter
in most states by a mid-century constitutional revision banning special
legislation in general or divorce bills in particular. 190 The motivation for taking
divorce away from the legislature has been explained, by Lawrence Friedman,
as a function of resources: The demand for divorce outstripped legislative
capacity. 191  Richard Chused attributes the change to conservative law
reform-legislative discretion to grant divorces on an ad hoc basis could be
reined in by crafting statutes providing for judicial divorce only on narrow,
specified grounds. 192 Hartog suggests that the transition to judicial divorce
reflected newfound concerns about institutional competence. 193
Early statutes providing for judicial divorce varied considerably from state
to state. The first generation of statutes, enacted in the first quarter of the
nineteenth century, included some that were quite liberal, 194 and some that
were initially strict but quickly liberalized. 195 Iowa, for example, provided for
divorce on numerous grounds, including when "either party shall offer such
THE UNITED STATES (1988); MAY, supra note 40; WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, DIVORCE IN THE
PROGREssIvE ERA (1967); RODERICK PILLIPs, supra note 173; MAx RHE NSTEiN, MARRIAGE
STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN
TRADION (1991); STONE, supra note 42.
186. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 204. Prior to 1857, parliamentary divorce might
have been an option for the very wealthy. Id.
187. See Censer, supra note 11, at 26-27 (challenging the frequent assertion that
southern states other than the "intractable South Carolina" had more conservative divorce
laws in the nineteenth century); Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 62.
188. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 204-05. Many states permitted courts to grant
annulments and separations, while reserving the power of divorce to the legislature. See
SALMON, supra note 78, at 64-65.
189. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, at 204-05; see generally CHUSED, supra note 185
(examining the rise, existence, and fall of legislative divorce in Maryland).
190. P. 71-72.
191. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 652 ("In large part, the rise of the judicial divorce
was a function of increased demand. The legislative system was simply not geared to
processing divorces in quantity.").
192. CHUSED, supra note 185, at 109-31.
193. Pp. 71-72.
194. Friedman, supra note 28, at 654 (citing an 1822 Rhode Island law that granted
divorce for typical grounds or "any other gross misbehavior and wickedness... repugnant to
or in violation of the marriage covenant").
195. See Censer, supra note 111, at 26 (noting widespread liberalization of divorce
laws between 1830 and 1860).
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indignities to the person of the other as shall render his or her situation
intolerable." 196 Other states liberalized their laws by enlarging the grounds for
divorce to include those that had previously only justified separation. 197 New
York marked the conservative end, providing that adultery was the only ground
for divorce.198 Massachusetts forged a middle ground, permitting divorce on
more malleable grounds such as desertion. 199
But most of those early, liberal laws fell prey to antidivorce reform in the
second half of the century. Rather than steadily loosening, divorce laws in the
nineteenth century expanded and constricted as reformers on one side or the
other carried the day.200 The middle of the century saw the restriction of
initially liberal laws. States with open-ended or so-called omnibus clauses
repealed them and replaced them with a stricter standard.20 1 As the century
progressed, other states tinkered as well. Some made divorce easier in order to
attract the divorce business, by expanding the available grounds, reducing the
length of residency required, or loosening restrictions on remarriage. 202 Others
amended their laws to bring about a reduction in the divorce rate.20 3
As the close of the nineteenth century approached, the grounds required for
divorce varied significantly from state to state. New York continued to anchor
the conservative end of the spectrum by authorizing divorce only for
adultery.204 California, on the other hand, had a fairly liberal statute, allowing
divorce on grounds of adultery, neglect, abandonment, intemperance, cruelty,
196. IowA REv. STAT. cl. 65, § 2 (1843). Connecticut, for example, provided for
divorce on the basis of "misconduct," which included any act "that permanently destroys the
happiness of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the marriage relation." Act of June 19,
1849, ch. 21, 1849 Conn. Acts 17, quoted in Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 63; see
also DiFonzo, supra note 59, at 886-87 (cataloguing examples of open-ended divorce
grounds that appeared mid-nineteenth century).
197. Censer, supra note 111, at 24.
198. N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. 8, tit. 1, § 42 (1852).
199. MASS. GEN. LAws cl. 107, § 7 (1860).
200. BASCH, supra note 21, at 68-93 (describing both sides of the reform movement
between 1850 and 1870); Friedman, supra note 28, at 657 (stating with respect to divorce,
"there was always a countermovement, opposed to simplicity and reform").
201. See Friedman, supra note 28, at 654; CoTr, supra note 9, at 110 (noting that most
states with omnibus grounds for divorce repealed them in the 1870s).
202. These are the features of codified divorce law that states altered to appeal to
migratory divorce business. See generally FRiEDMAN, supra note 61, at 503 (stating that to
"attract the 'tourist trade,' a state needed easy laws and a short residence period"); Friedman,
supra note 28, at 661-62 (discussing the so-called "divorce mills" of the nineteenth century).
203. See MAY, supra note 40, at 4 ("Between 1889 and 1906, as the divorce rate began
to accelerate rapidly, state legislatures across the country, most of them in the East, enacted
more than one hundred pieces of restrictive marriage and divorce legislation in an effort to
stem the tide.").
204. P. 72. Until 1966, New York continued to permit divorce only on grounds of
adultery. See N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. 8, tit. 1, § 42 (1852). In 1966, New York amended its
laws to allow divorce based on cruelty or desertion, as well as a separation of two years.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1966).
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or felony conviction. 205  Most other states fell somewhere in between-
typically permitting divorce for adultery, abandonment, and neglect. 20 6 By the
turn of the twentieth century, many states had early no-fault provisions,
permitting a couple to file for divorce based solely on the fact that they had
lived apart for a significant period.207
3. The practical availability of divorce.
Separation permitted Abigail Bailey to reconcile her marital misgivings
with her Christianity. In her eyes, she needed to stay married to avoid being a
sinner, but needed to separate from her husband's sins for the same reason.208
And because she did not need the right to remarry, a separation was a sufficient
remedy. For her, there were extralegal constraints on her ability or willingness
to obtain a divorce. Religious constraints undoubtedly limited the willingness
of other nineteenth-century spouses to seek a divorce. Religion played a
significant role in the debate over divorce reform in the middle of the
nineteenth century, and there is every reason to believe that reflected the
concerns of some portion of the population. 209
Another consequence of religious conviction was that some couples sought
annulments rather than divorces.210 A civil annulment-granted by a court, not
a church-decrees that no valid marriage ever existed due to a defect present at
the time of its inception. A canonical annulment accomplishes the same result,
though in the eyes of the church, not the law. Typical grounds for annulment in
the nineteenth century included bigamy, fraud, impotence, age, and insanity.211
Although the legal grounds do not expressly overlap, some couples eligible for
205. CAL. Civ. CODE § 92 (Hart 1889).
206. See Wright, supra note 110 (cataloguing grounds for divorce in every state).
207. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. STAT. ch. 107, § 10 (1859) (permitting absolute divorce
after ten-year separation); see also DiFonzo, supra note 59, at 946-47 (cataloguing state
provisions for divorce based on separation).
208. Pp. 53-54.
209. See BASCH, supra note 21, at 80-90 (describing the role of Christian moralists
within the debate).
210. Although Hartog suggests, based on appellate cases, that annulments were rarely
granted, there is reason to think otherwise. P. 99 ("Reasons entirely sufficient to justify
breaking an engagement-for example, the fact that a woman was carrying another man's
child, or that a man was impotent, or insanity on the part of either-were almost never
sufficient to obtain an annulment."). A study of annulment cases in California between
1890 and 1910 revealed that 53.5% of annulments were granted, most often for bigamy or
being underage. Joanna Grossman & Chris Guthrie, The Road Less Taken: Annulment at the
Turn of the Century, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 322 (1996). This may be an example of
appellate cases reflecting the prevailing ideology, but not the prevailing practice. But at the
same time the number of annulments sought in Alameda County during that period (93) was
minuscule compared to the number of divorces (6408). Id at 312 fig.1.
211. Some defects make a marriage void, making it invalid whether or not a court ever
formally declares it so. Others make the marriage voidable, which renders it invalid only
when the victim of the defect petitions for (and obtains) an annulment.
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divorce could also make out a case for annulment.212 But a civil annulment,
which erases the marriage and permits a second marriage to be treated like a
first, enabled spouses constrained by religious beliefs to reconcile a desire to
remarry with religious beliefs that prohibited multiple marriages.
Religion was not the only extralegal force influencing the decision whether
to stay married, separate, or divorce. Early nineteenth-century women were
under moral and ideological pressure to preserve their marriages-even if that
meant living apart.
In a culture that increasingly invested middle-class women with a powerful
moral influence over their husbands, which valorized the role of women in the
domestic sphere, and indeed, imbued women with an idealized autonomy in
the conjugal union, to succeed in divorce was tantamount to a more
fundamental sort of failure.2 13
A supposed heightened sense of morality was part of what qualified women for
their separate domestic sphere.214 That moral influence was supposed to be
exerted to coerce good husbandly behavior. The early women's temperance
movement borrowed that image, urging women "to appeal to the drunkard's
sense of family responsibility" to make them stop drinking.215 Separation-or
the ability to threaten it-may have been important to coercing behavioral
reform.
But by later in the century, the women's temperance movement was
growing throughout the country. 216 Once aligned with a men's temperance
movement, the women's movement split off as women began to see alcoholism
as one of the "wrongs done to women by men.' 217
In the second half of the century, temperance advocates tended to value
female self-preservation over a moral obligation to save marriages, and thus
they urged wives to exit marriage rather than engage in futile efforts to preserve
it.218 State laws gave credence to the new intolerance for habitual drinking by
adding intemperance as a grounds for divorce.2 19
212. See Grossman & Guthrie, supra note 210, at 323-24.
213. Basch, supra note 76, at 15.
214. Id. at 52, 100. See also BASCH, supra note 21, at 74-75 (describing some
feminists who favored protection within marriage as opposed to divorce, "in a familiar
endorsement of a wife's moral responsibility for marriage"); PLECK, supra note 56, at 52
(noting that separate spheres ideology "promoted the view that'women had the power to
reform the morals of fathers, sons, and brothers").
215. PLECK, supra note 56, at 49.
216. See PLECK, supra note 56, at 100-01.
217. Id. at 50. See also Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 12, at 2127 (crediting
temperance reformers for drawing attention to the problem of wife-beating).
218. See PLE K, supra note 56, at 49-50,55.
219. Compare, e.g., MICH. REv. STAT. pt. 2, tit. 7, ch. 2, § 3 (1838) (making no
provision for divorce based on intemperance) with MICH. GEN. STAT. ch. 237, § 6228 (1883)
(providing for an absolute divorce when either "the husband or wife shall have become an
habitual drunkard"). See also CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 92, 106 (Hart 1889). Although few of the
divorce cases in the Alameda County study were brought on grounds of temperance, as
1648 [Vol. 53:1613
SEPARATED SPOUSES
The emerging women's rights movement may have also have encouraged
women later in the nineteenth century to seek divorces. Marriage, according to
those early reformers, oppressed women.220 Elizabeth Cady Stanton was the
most outspoken pro-divorce feminist, proclaiming at one point that "It is vain
to look for the elevation of woman so long as she is degraded in marriage.
2 21
But did these feminist, pro-divorce sentiments affect ordinary women?
Studies of divorce records give some support for the assertion that the rising
divorce rate was in part a function of "women's drive for greater autonomy
within marriage and the family."222 Divorces were sought and obtained more
and more by women: In 1867, 62 percent of divorce plaintiffs nationally were
women; this number steadily increased to almost 75 percent by the mid-
twentieth century.223
The grounds on which women sought divorce also support this theory of
greater autonomy. Most claims by women revolved around allegations of
inadequate or inappropriate familial behavior by husbands: cruelty, desertion,
drunkenness, and failure to provide.224 Women were "demanding their rights
under the doctrine of separate spheres. ' 'z25 The cases reflect an "unwillingness
to resign themselves to the husband's inordinate power within the family."226
A few women in the Alameda County study explicitly adverted to feminist
principles in justifying their petitions. For example, Mrs. Van Slyke testified
that she would "have much better enjoyed life could she have been [sic] borne a
widow, thus freeing herself from any of the possible cares of married life, and
still enjoy a freedom which unmarried ladies are denied. '227 Moses Greenberg
sought a divorce because his wife "thought that the whole marriage system was
many as twenty percent adverted to alcohol abuse in describing the alleged grounds. See
Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13.
220. P. 102 (describing the reformers' belief that marriage should be condemned as an
usurpation of God's authority to cause self-transformation).
221. DEGLER, supra note 165, at 175; see also id. at 165 (quoting a feminist English
professor, Vida Scudder, who warned her students considering marriage that "If your
marriage is like most I know, it will begin as an indulgence but will proceed into a
discipline"). Degler presents a compelling account of the ways in which women's quest for
equality drove the divorce rate at the end of the nineteenth century. Id. at 144-77; see also
BASCH, supra note 21, at 68 (observing that between 1850 and 1870, "feminism was now in
play in the debate over divorce").
222. DEGLER, supra note 165, at 168.
223. See id.; Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 70; Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda
County Study, supra note 13. Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival interpret this statistic
as a product of the collusive nature of divorce. Because women were likely to end up with
the children, by agreement, and because men stood to lose less by being accused of adultery,
cruelty, or the like, a couple colluding to obtain a divorce would naturally choose the wife to
be the "innocent" plaintiff. See Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 79.
224. See Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 70-71.
225. DEGLER, supra note 165, at 169.
226. Id. at 170.




wrong. She thought people should just simply live together, and if there were
children the state should provide for them. Nobody ought to be forced to live
with another system. '228
But these feminist ideals had an uncertain impact on the way most ordinary
women thought about themselves and marriage. When lobbying the New York
Legislature in 1854 to grant a variety of rights to women, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton took pains to anticipate and respond to the legislators, who she thought
"may say that the mass of the women of this State do not make the demand; it
comes from a few sour, disappointed old maids and childless women. '2 29 Her
response is a series of hypotheticals, challenging the legislators to believe that
women who were deprived of property, underpaid for physically demanding
work, or beaten by drunken husbands would not want greater rights if asked.
"For all these, then, we speak."230 Stanton is careful never to assert that these
women do want these rights, only that it is inconceivable that they would not
want them. For, in the end, she was unable to say that women on the whole
were clamoring for release from the confines of marriage.
All told, it may be that the preference for separation over divorce lessened
as the nineteenth century progressed, as the emphasis on female self-
preservation gave way to a desire for individual fulfillment. This latter goal
was hard to accomplish through separation.
4. The relative consequences of separation and divorce.
Perhaps the piece of research most called for, but not undertaken, by
Hartog's book is an in-depth comparison of the relative consequences of
separation and divorce. Knowing how the typical wife fared in separation
relative to divorce in terms of custody, alimony, child support, and the division
of property is essential to understanding why some may have chosen separation
over divorce. Unfortunately, the research on this point is piecemeal.
In her study of divorce records between 1815 and 1870, Norma Basch
found that legal separation in New York "tended to provide women with far
more favorable financial terms than a complete divorce." 231 Separation, she
concluded, enabled women to enforce the husband's duty of support by
formally continuing the marriage, 232 while alimony "never enjoyed the same
fundamental legitimacy." 233 In addition to support, courts could also prevent a
228. Id., Docket No. 22614.
229. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New York (Feb.
14, 1854), in 1 HIsToRY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 604 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1883).
230. Id.
231. Basch, supra note 76, at 10.
232. Id.
233. BASCH, supra note 21, at 109.
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husband's interference with a separated wife's business,234 although such
requests were made only by women who already benefited from some financial
independence. In contrast, many women in Basch's study received no financial
relief when they obtained divorces.235
But perhaps undermining the claim that separation was more beneficial to
women is Nancy Cott's contention that in Massachusetts, a legal separation did
not restore a woman to feme sole status.2 36 A separated wife who is treated as
a married woman has the worst of both worlds economically, lacking both her
husband's support and the legal status necessary to eke out a living. If her
contention is correct, the preference for separation, even formal separation,
over divorce becomes more surprising.237
Marylynn Salmon also found that some women in the early part of the
nineteenth century opted for separation because they fared better under a
separate maintenance agreement than a divorce without alimony.238 But later
in the century, alimony was available in most states following an absolute
divorce as well as a separation.
In the Alameda County study of divorce at the turn of the century,
considerably later than the period studied by Basch and Salmon, alimony was
awarded in 7.6% of the cases where the couple had no children, and 15.8% of
those with children.239 When women were awarded custody (which they were
80% of the time),240 they were also often awarded child support, ranging from
5 to 125 dollars a month.241 But that study contains no data on separation cases
for purposes of making a comparison, and there are no comparable studies of
separation. Much more evidence is needed to draw conclusions about the
relative benefits of separation over divorce, and whether they lessened
throughout the course of the nineteenth century.
An empirical comparison of the separation and divorce rates in particular
jurisdictions would add to Hartog's work in an important way. As it is, there
are almost no studies of separation. Herman Lantz conducted a study of
separation, in which he found 3300 notices of separation in the newspapers of
234. Basch, supra note 76, at 10-11.
235. Id. at 13. Nancy Cott found a similar absence of financial support in her analysis
of eighteenth-century divorce decrees in Massachusetts. See Cott, supra note 33, at 610.
236. See Cott, supra note 33, at 30.
237. Women in such a jurisdiction would fare better by applying for feme sole trader
status rather than a separation. See note 87 supra.
238. SALMON, supra note 78, at 67 ("It is interesting to note that when a choice was
available [in Pennsylvania after 1815], some women preferred separations with alimony to
absolute divorces. Their decision may indicate that they preferred the financial security of a
decree of alimony to the right to remarry.").
239. Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13.
240. Id.
241. To put this number in perspective, the average husband's salary in this study was
99 dollars per month.
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several states between 1700 and 1800.242 Nancy Cott, in contrast, found only
220 divorce cases in Massachusetts, a relatively liberal divorce state, in the
eighteenth century.243 A comparison of these two studies might suggest that
separation was in fact more common than divorce, although even that limited
inference is made difficult by the fact that the studies cover different
jurisdictions. Moreover, because divorce was highly restricted in the
eighteenth century, many couples may not have had a choice between
separation and divorce. The data available do suggest that marital discord was
not an invention of the nineteenth century, but that is not Hartog's main point.
His inquiry assumes a background level of marital unhappiness and explores
the ways in which couples gave effect to their desires for exit. Only an
empirical study comparing separation and divorce in the same nineteenth-
century jurisdiction would furnish the data necessary to support such an
analysis.
5. Separation and the divorce rate.
Hartog's study of separation is also important in reconsidering the
nineteenth-century divorce reform movement. A central assumption on both
sides of the debate about how to reduce the divorce rate has been that strict
divorce laws prevent divorce, while loose ones encourage it.244 Despite
statistical evidence to the contrary, 245 anti-divorce reformers insisted that the
242. LANTZ, supra note 42, at 15-27, cited in DEGLER, supra note 165, at 165-66.
Most of these notices were placed by men whose wives had left them, DEGLER, supra note
165, at 166, and they had the effect of putting merchants on notice not to extend credit to the
separated wives. See LANTZ, supra note 42, at 17. A notice in the newspaper does not give
any indication whether the separation was lawful (i.e., court approved) or unlawful, nor does
it confirm an actual separation as opposed to a tactic used to coerce reconciliation or
obedience.
243. Cott, supra note 236, at 20, cited in DEGLER, supra note 165, at 165-66
(comparing Lantz's and Cott's findings).
244. See Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 62 (citing the popular view that
"[e]asy divorce would loosen the family structure and threaten the death of civilization").
245. Most studies suggest that there is almost no correlation between changes in
divorce laws and the divorce rate. See, e.g., ALFRED CAHEN, STATsnTCAL ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN DIVORCE (1932) (concluding that social and economic factors, rather than legal
changes, exert the primary influences on the divorce rate); James P. Lichtenberger, Divorce: A
Study in Social Causation, 35 STUD. HIST. ECON. & PuB. L. 339, 11 (1909) (citing WRIGHT,
supra note 110 and BUREAU OFTHE CENSUS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, A SPECiAL
REPORT ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1867-1906) (concluding that changes in divorce laws were
ineffective in influencing the divorce rate); WALTER F. WILLcox, THE DIVORCE PROBLEM 48-57
(2d ed. 1897) (finding no causal relationship between changes in divorce laws and a state's
divorce rate); THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, DIVORCE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION ESPECIALLY IN THE
UNrrED STATES (2d ed. 1882) (concluding that the divorce rate was not significantly affected by




easy divorce laws were fueling the rapidly rising number of divorces.246
"[P]ious men and other conservatives" sought a strict, national law of marriage
that would restore strength to Christian ideals about marriage and stop
divorce.247 Pro-divorce reformers operated from the same point. Assuming
strict divorce laws were forcing women to stay in oppressive marriages,
women's rights advocates pushed for liberalization of divorce laws. 248
The conventional response to the argument that divorce law was an
effective way to control the divorce rate or the rate of marital breakdown is
collusion. That is, strict divorce laws do not prevent divorce, but instead
require couples to engage in perjury and collusion to obtain it. Many of the
movements to liberalize divorce law at the end of the nineteenth century and
into the twentieth century were expressly motivated, in fact, by the desire to put
an end to the dishonesty and fraud that pervaded the divorce system.249
Hartog suggests separation as another response. Hartog's explication of
the prevalence and importance of separation undermines the premise that
whether couples seek a divorce is a function solely of whether the law makes it
available. There are a whole variety of legal and extralegal factors that might
have influenced a couple not to seek a divorce, not simply the fact that it was
unavailable. He suggests instead that many couples preferred separation
whether or not divorce was accessible.25 0
Both the conventional response and Hartog's response are important to our
understanding not only of nineteenth-century marriage, but also of modem
divorce law. The assumption that law is a precise tool for manipulating the
divorce rate did not fade with the close of the nineteenth century, nor the close
of the twentieth. The past decade has witnessed its fervent revival, as many
246. See, e.g., PLcK, supra note 56, at 60-61 (discussing anti-divorce advocacy).
Although the public was outraged about the rising divorce rate toward the end of the
nineteenth century, it was relatively low compared to the rate today. It rose from less than
two divorces per thousand marriages in 1870 to four per thousand marriages in 1900. See
CoTr, supra note 9, at 107.
247. P. 19. The clamoring for a truly federal law of marriage was never successful.
But the federal government always tried to implement a strong pro-marriage policy, while
deferring to states on the mechanics. See CoTr, supra note 9, at 24, 27-28.
248. Pp. 18-19. Movements to liberalize divorce laws generally were tied to notions of
freedom. See Co-r, supra note 9, at 47.
249. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 28, at 666 (noting that the no-fault revolution was
precipitated by general recognition that the then-existing system was "a fake"); Richard H.
Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 303, 304 (1950) (quoting from a
report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York that argued for "a liberalization
of the divorce laws under proper legal sanctions" in order to "eliminate what has come to be
recognized as a scandal, growing out of widespread fraud, perjury, collusion, and connivance
which now pervade the dissolution of marriages"); see also GLENDON, supra note 111, at 63
("[S]tatutory changes... were preceded by a period of widespread evasion of the law
through collusion and travel."); JACOB, supra note 185, at 148 (noting that a "key argument
in favor of no-fault divorce was that it would eliminate fraud and decrease the bitterness of
divorce actions").
250. Pp. 37-38, 84-86.
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states struggle to control a perceived explosion in the divorce rate.251 Two
states have modified their systems of marriage and divorce, with an eye to
reducing the divorce rate.252 Louisiana, the first to act, adopted a so-called
"covenant marriage" system.253 Under the new laws, couples choose between
a "regular" marriage and a "covenant" marriage; the two types of marriages
differ at the time of entry and exit. At the time of entry, a covenant marriage
requires premarital counseling.254 At the time of exit, a couple's access to
divorce is limited; the concept of "fault" is restored for anyone seeldng a
divorce immediately, while no-fault is available only for those willing to wait
two years, double the wait imposed on "regular" spouses.255 Arizona's system
is similar, though it gives couples an out by providing that the covenant could
be dissolved upon mutual agreement of the parties.256
The legislative goal of these acts, and the proposals other legislatures
considered but did not adopt, is clear: to stem the rising tide of divorce.257
251. Bartlett, supra note 36, at 812 (noting the current debate about the significance of
marriage: "One prescription urged by reformers is to make divorce more difficult by
eliminating no-fault grounds, instituting longer waiting periods, or both.").
252. See An Act... Relative to Covenant Marriage, 1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1380
(West) (codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-75, 307-09 (West Supp. 2000)); An
Act... Relating to Marriage, 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 135, SB 1133.
253. For a thorough analysis of Louisiana's new law and its implications, see Bix,
supra note 8; Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's D4ja Vu All Over Again": The Covenant
Marriage Act in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1701
(1998); DiFonzo, supra note 59; Lynne Marie Kohm, A Comparative Survey of Covenant
Marriage Proposals in the United States, 12 REGENT U.L. REv. 31 (1999/2000); Elizabeth S.
Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of
Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2000).
254. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:273 (A)-(B) (West Supp. 2000).
255. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (A) (West Supp. 2000).
256. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 25-903 (2000).
257. See David Blankenhom, Quickie Divorce: Do We Need It?, REC. (Northern New
Jersey), June 19, 1998, at LI1 (commenting on various legislative proposals to reform
marriage: "Almost everywhere, the goals of reformers are the same: to lower the divorce rate
and to improve marriage."); Family Life Council to Mark 30 Years, GREENSBORO NEWs &
REc., Aug. 26, 1998, at 7 (commenting on proposals to require premarital counseling: "The
ultimate goal is to reduce the divorce rate ...."); Gary Heinlein, Lawmaker Wants to Cut
Divorce Rate: Proposal Would Let Couples Enter Into Covenant Marriages, DETRoIT NmWs,
Aug. 3, 1998, at DI ("State Rep. Harold Voorhees said his proposal [for covenant marriage]
might help change the fact that more than half of all Michigan marriages don't even last 15
years"); Mike McCloy, Tougher Wedding Options, AIZ. REPuBLIc, May 19, 1998, at Al
(describing supporters' belief that the "voluntary covenant marriage bill .... could further
reduce the state's divorce rate"); Virginia Norton, Divorce a Problem, AUGUSTA CHRON., at
C1 ("Wider use of premarital counseling, covenant marriages and tightening divorce laws
could put the brakes on family breakups, say researchers in Georgia and South Carolina.");
William Pack, Accurate U.S. Divorce Figures Hard to Find, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Mar.
12, 1998, at B 1I (University of Virginia sociologist speculates that "as covenant marriages
become more popular, the divorce rate will fall."); Poor Divorce Solution, PRESs J. (Vero
Beach, Fla.), June 10, 1998, at A14 (commenting on Florida's legislative encouragement for
premarital counseling and education: "The idea was to curb the divorce rate .... ); Saving
Marriages, Editorial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 29, 1998, at A16 (commenting on
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Other states have enacted less dramatic measures perceived, too, as antidotes to
divorce.258 The Florida legislature recently enacted a provision requiring
marriage education in high schools, reduced marriage license fees for couples
that receive premarital counseling, and mandatory parenting classes for
divorcing parents with minor children.25 9 Nebraska and West Virginia passed
measures requiring parenting classes for divorcing couples with children.2 60 In
addition, "community marriage policies" requiring counseling and waiting
periods before permitting divorce have been passed by numerous
municipalities. 26 1 What these modem statutes tell us is that lawmakers and
commentators continue to overemphasize the role of divorce law in regulating
marriages.
C. Informal Versus Formal Separation
Asa and Abigail Bailey, like many other husbands and wives, tried to keep
their separation informal. They did what many couples did: enter into a written
"separation agreement" guaranteeing that their property would be divided in
such a way as to support both of them. Hartog uses the Baileys to illustrate a
more general preference for informal over formal separations. Although
Hartog makes a compelling case that informal separations were common and
introduction of covenant marriage bill: "Society desperately needs more stable, committed,
lasting marriages. The best evidence of that are the soaring rates of divorce.. . ."); Jenifer
Warren, No-Fault Divorce Under Fire in State, Nation, L.A. TuMes, Apr. 12, 1998, at Al
(describing national movement to end no-fault divorce out of dismay for the "nation's high
divorce rate"); Richard Wolf, States Slow to Plunge into Covenant Marriage, USA TODAY,
June 16, 1998, at 3A (stating that the creation of covenant marriage laws "is a reflection of
growing concern over divorce rates, which have been declining slightly since 1981 but
remain high enough to affect nearly half of marriages"). See also Bartlett, supra note 36, at
825 (questioning whether the covenant marriage act's restriction on divorce will have any
effect on the rising divorce rate).
258. The reintroduction of fault to the divorce regime, or other structural changes
designed to reduce the incidence of divorce, find some support in both conservative and
progressive circles. See Bartlett, supra note 36, at 812 n.7 (cataloguing support from both
sides for legal and policy changes designed to reduce incidence of divorce).
259. FLA. STAT. ch. 232.246(3)(i) (2000) (marriage education); FLA. STAT. ch.
741.0305(1) (2000) (reduced fees); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.21 (2000) (parenting classes).
260. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-349.01 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 48-11-104 (2000).
261. For example, the affianced in Lenawee County who wish to be married by any
magistrate, judge, or public official have to complete prenuptial counseling in addition to
paying the $20 marriage license fee charged in all other Michigan counties. Dee-Ann
Durbin, Hear Ye! Judges Require Premarital Counseling, But Couples Don't Want to Listen,
GRAND RAPIDS PREss, June 8, 1998, at B4; Bonnie Miller Rubin, Training to Tie the Knot,
Cm. Tam., July 6, 1997, at Cl. The Missouri legislature recently considered a proposal to
erect a "Marriage Restoration Fund," offering $1,000 to couples over twenty-one who get
married and are able to certify that the woman has not had an abortion, neither partner has
had a sexually transmitted disease, neither has a child, and neither has been previously
married. Kim Bell, Law Would Give Missourians $1,000 to Wed, Strings Attached, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 13, 1998, at Al.
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postulates some plausible reasons for such a preference, the explanations are
not completely satisfying.
Informal separations were surely less public, and could often be explained
(truthfully or not) under the guise of the husband's search for land or work or
even his death. 262 But informal separations were an imperfect remedy for
women. Although they undoubtedly functioned in some cases to protect
reputations, honor religious mandates, or stave off immediate physical danger,
they provided little or no financial security-an admittedly important aspect of
female self-preservation. 263
An informally separated wife did not have the rights of a single woman.
Her identity was covered over by her husband's, as it would have been if they
had continued to live together. Although many couples relied on separation
agreements to allow the wife to own property and function independently, the
doctrine of coverture made such agreements "patently unlawful."2 64 With Lord
Kenyon's decision in Marshall v. Rutton,2 65 holding separation agreements
invalid, and its wholesale adoption by American courts, American women
reaped no financial security from a separate maintenance agreement. Yet many
wives continued to informally separate from their husbands and to enter into
such agreements. 266
Maybe psychological theory can explain why spouses continued to enter
into contracts they knew to be unenforceable. Elizabeth Scott has applied
precommitment theory in the context of divorce, contending that couples who
contractually agree to reduce their access to divorce will be less likely to want
one; such agreed restrictions "enable the individual to adhere to the initial
utility-maximizing plan."267  That same theory might explain nineteenth-
century couples who entered into unenforceable separation agreements. There
may also have been extralegal consequences affecting reputation, religious or
moral purity, or trustworthiness in private enterprise that influenced some men
to honor their agreements.
Hartog suggests that the act of contracting with one's husband was
undoubtedly "transformative and regenerative, as a way to assert possession of
an individual self capable of acting in and on the world. '2 68 But that
explanation seems inadequate to explain why women would rely on voluntary
separations in the first place, with all the uncertainty they promised. Surely the
262. See P. 57.
263. Of course, even court-ordered support did not guarantee security. By all accounts,
compliance rates for alimony and child-support in the nineteenth century were low. And
many women did not receive orders of support in the first instance.
264. P. 57. See also text accompanying notes 140-148 supra.
265. 8 T.R. 545 101 Eng. Rep. 1538 (K.B. 1800).
266. P. 83. See also SALMON, supra note 78, at 59.
267. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA.




act of filing for separation or divorce-and winning-would be similarly
"transformative and regenerative." But if Hartog is right that the perceived
alternative to a contractual separation was not divorce but "simple
abandonment," 269 then the proliferation of separation agreements may make
more sense. Some protection is better than none.
Without the benefit of an enforceable separation agreement, or the legal
right to operate as a feme sole,270 informally separated women lacked the basic
ability to function independently and support themselves. The Married
Women's Property Acts eventually came to restore that ability to married-and
separated-women. 271 Whether these acts had any effect on the total rate of
separation or the ratio of informal to formal separations would be valuable to
this analysis.
Hartog also contends that cost was a deterrent to seeking legal process, 272
but more evidence of its significance is needed. How costly was it to obtain a
legal separation or divorce? The Alameda County study of divorce suggests
that the typical divorce at the turn of the century cost seventy-six dollars-
about three-quarters of an average defendant-husband's monthly salary.
Separations from bed and board were no doubt comparably costly. But that
figure does not account for legal representation, and in that study, two-thirds of
the plaintiffs were represented by lawyers. This may have been prohibitively
costly. But Norma Basch reports that many states in the 1820s and 1830s
specifically addressed the inability of the poor to afford divorce with statutes
waiving fees for the impoverished and sometimes for women.273 And by the
end of the nineteenth century, divorce seekers, in fact, came from all walks of
life.274
269. P. 84. The line between "simple abandonment" and divorce is difficult to discern.
In many jurisdictions, abandonment was the most common ground for divorce. See, e.g.,
Petrik, supra note 167, at 155 (finding that two-thirds of all divorces recorded in one
Wyoming county between 1869 and 1900 were premised on desertion, typically by men);
see also Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13 (finding that desertion
was the most common ground for divorce in Alameda County between 1890 and 1910,
comprising 40% of all divorce petitions).
270. See note 87 supra.
271. See text accompanying notes 61-62,79-80, 106 supra.
272. P. 84; see also PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD:
FAMILmS, SEx, AND Tm LAW IN m NInmrErrH-CENTuRY SoUTH 34 (1995) (arguing that
couples in the South separated without the benefit of a legal decree because "[flew poor
whites and free blacks had the resources or time to pursue a divorce"); Friedman, supra note
28, at 663 ("Even an ordinary, collusive divorce cost money .... ); Friedman & Percival,
supra note 36, at 77 ("Divorce was costly; ordinary people used desertion, infidelity, and
informal cohabitation to get around an inconvenient marriage.").
273. BASCH, supra note 21, at 53-55.
274. GRiswoLD, supra note 18, at 25 (finding that 66% of couples in divorce court
could be characterized below "middle class"); Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study,




Another plausible explanation for the preference for informal separation is
that legal process may have been particularly inaccessible to women. Hartog's
description early in the book of law as a uniquely male domain may shed light
on women's preference for informal, albeit unreliable, separations. Throughout
the nineteenth century, judges and lawyers were almost exclusively male.275
And as Norma Basch has explained, the process of formally dissolving a
marriage
imposed particular burdens on female plaintiffs. A woman subjected the
intimate details of her marriage to the scrutiny of an all-male judiciary, and
while the text of the divorce focused on her husband's guilt, the subtext
revolved around her own impeccable innocence. Surely, when they balanced
the value of the remedy against its psychic and economic costs, countless
women opted for simpler, cheaper, extralegal alternatives.276
To explain the prevalence of informal separations, Hartog also reinvokes
the explanation that many women living apart from their husbands still
preferred to be married, but living apart, than divorced. But that explanation,
while useful to explain the preference for separation over divorce, is not
probative of why women chose informal over formal separations. In the
nineteenth century, myriad legal rights flowed from the determination that a
woman was legally entitled to separate-something that only occurred when a
court decreed it. Without a formal separation, women living apart from their
husbands had no right to their support277 and no right to the custody of their
children.27 8
This preference for informal separation is also hard to reconcile with
Lawrence Friedman's explanation for the rise in divorce at the end of the
nineteenth century. He contends that in the nineteenth century, "[a]bsolute
divorce tended to replace separation," because people with broken marriages
wanted divorce as a legal status, for economic reasons, connected with property
275. Pp. 11-23.
276. Basch, supra note 76, at 15.
277. P. 158.
278. Pp. 204, 212. By the turn of the twentieth century, courts freely gave divorcing
wives custody of their children. GRIsWoLD, supra note 18, at 153 (finding that "female
petitioners received custody in 91 percent of their suits, men in just 37 percent"); MAY,
supra note 40, at 173 (finding that wives were almost always granted custody in study of
New Jersey and California divorce cases between 1880 and 1920); Grossman & Guthrie,
Alameda County Study, supra note 13. But even earlier in the century, custody was
sometimes granted to women following divorce. See generally GROSSBERG, supra note 8, at
281-85 (describing evolution of custody law in the nineteenth century away from
presumptive paternal custody); MASON, supra note 177, at xiii (describing nineteenth-
century shift "away from fathers' common law rights to custody and control of their children
toward a modem emphasis on the best interests of the child, with a presumption in favor of
mothers as the more nurturing parent"). But without a divorce, courts required wives to




rights."279 Divorce not only legitimizes remarriage, but changes inheritance
rights and clarifies title to real property. 280 Although this explanation was
offered to explain divorce over separation, it might also support a preference
for formal over informal separation.
III. STATUS THREE: SEPARATED OR DIVORCED (BUT NOT SINGLE)
Hartog's analysis of separation is also important to understanding the
importance of marriage-and remarriage-to nineteenth-century couples. The
pervasiveness of separation and divorce in the nineteenth century does not
indicate that the ideal of marriage had been discarded. To the contrary, men
and women, he contends, wanted to be married-so much so that if their first
attempts were unsuccessful, they wanted to try again. Reconsidered in that
light, the demand for separation or divorce becomes important more as a
pathway to marriage than an exit from it.
A. The Importance and Desirability of Marriage
Though the law of marriage was developed in the context of marital failure
and dissolution, marriage itself remained an important public value. 281 It
played a prime role not only in how men and women structured their lives, but
also in prevailing theories of community governance. Eighteenth-century
republican ideology emphasized the role of the family in inculcating civic
virtue: Women were charged with the task of preparing their sons for
participation in political and public life. 282 Men gained credibility in the public
and political arena through marriage. As Hartog explains:
[A] man's identity and his honor were deeply tied to his marital status. Being
a householder, being someone who cared for and controlled a family, gave a
man political significance. It was a foundation for republican political virtue.
As the caretaker of a wife, children, and servants, a man became the sovereign
279. Friedman, supra note 28, at 655.
280. The "dramatic changes in divorce law in the early nineteenth century lend
themselves to a standard kind of economic explanation based on property interests, the
demands of a broad-based, active land market, the need for clear tfles, and for devolution
and disposition of property along rational lines." Id. Many explain the Married Women's
Property Acts in similar terms. See note 61 supra.
281. Interestingly, although today there is arguably less of an emphasis on the
importance of marriage, the marriage rate is comparable to that in the late nineteenth
century. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (rev. ed.
1992).
282. See LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 229 (1980) ("[T]heorists created a mother who had a political
purpose and argued that her domestic behavior had a direct political function in the
Republic."); see also HOFF, supra note 61, at 79.
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of a domain, able to meet with other rulers and to participate with them in
government.283
For men, marriage was also intertwined with citizenship; the qualities that
made men good husbands and fathers were thought to make them good
candidates for citizenship. 284 In a similar vein, the right to assume the
responsibilities of marriage and fatherhood was linked, for ex-slaves, with
freedom.2 85
Unlike the preceding centuries, when families were openly premised on
male patriarchy and female subordination,286 nineteenth-century husbands and
wives had expectations of "love, affection, and mutuality. '287 Robert Griswold
contends that the second half of the century witnessed the
full flowering of the companionate ideal, an ideal predicated on the notion of
domestic equality between husbands and wives.... [They saw] the arrival of
family relations grounded in a partnership between husbands and wives who,
although working in different spheres, owed each other mutual deference,
respect, kindness, and love.288
William O'Neill argues that affection and emotional intimacy became
central to nineteenth-century marriage.289 The changing nature of the family,
in turn, put increased pressure on the divorce system because when "families
become the center of social organization, their intimacy can become
suffocating, their demands unbearable, and their expectations too high to be
easily realizable. '290 Higher expectations for marriage at once put greater
283. P. 101.
284. See ConT, supra note 9, at 142 (discussing Theodore Roosevelt's belief that
"home virtues" were related to civic virtue for men).
285. Id. at 94.
286. See generally NANCY F. CoTT, THE BoNDs oF WOMANHOOD: "W OMAN'S SPInE"
w NEw ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 5-9 (1977); GRiswoLD, supra note 18, at 9 (noting that the
"evidence suggests that eighteenth-century women occupied a subordinate position in the
family and in society"); Cott, supra note 33.
287. GRiswoLD, supra note 18, at 3; see also CoTr, supra note 9, at 150 (noting that
turn-of-the-century Americans "were very much committed to marriage founded on love").
288. Id. at 5; Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 78 (noting that by the turn of the
century, "a wife was to be more than sex partner, servant, and nursemaid; a husband was to
be more than a breadwinner and protector"). Theoretical and prescriptive literature supports
this characterization of marriage, as do upper-class memoirs. See generally DEGLER, supra
note 165; GiuswoLD, supra note 18, at 2. Whether the companionate ideal reached beyond
the elite is not clear. Robert Griswold concluded based on divorce records between 1850
and 1890 that "men and women from all social classes conceived of family relations in
affective terms, [and] placed a premium on emotional fulfillment in the family .. "
GRIswOLD, supra note 18, at 5. But see Petrik, supra note 167, at 181 (concluding based on
divorce records that the concept of companionate marriage was more prevalent among the
"veteran middle class" rather than the soon-to-be middle class).
289. See O'NELL, supra note 185, at 6-7. Reva Siegel argues that the rhetoric of the
companionate ideal made it difficult for courts to recognize an express right of chastisement,
but permitted them to rationalize the same result by adverting to the need for marital privacy
that accompanied the new ideal. See Siegel, Rule of Love, supra note 12, at 2152.




pressure on the law for easy exits and made marriage-and remarriage-
appealing. A truly companionate marriage was worth more effort to find than
its seventeenth- or eighteenth-century counterpart.
But men and women were not affected the same way by marriage, and the
explanation for their desire to marry therefore must differ. For nineteenth-
century men, like their seventeenth- and eighteenth-century counterparts, the
desire to be married can be explained by remembering
how important being married was in nineteenth-century America: important in
terms of the labor of maintaining a household, important as a public matter of
being recognized as a competent (male) adult, important as a defense against
the emotional isolation that always threatened in mobile America.29 1
Staying married was also important to men, as separation or divorce
undermined their status.292
Women's acquiescence to marriage is somewhat harder to explain. Why,
Hartog asks, did women willingly enter into a state of inferiority and legally
imposed disability? As early as 1848, when the first mobilized women's rights
activists convened in Seneca Falls, marriage and its accompanying disabilities
became a feminist target. In describing "a history of repeated injuries and
usurpations on the part of man toward woman," the convention's participants
included the following complaint:
He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.
He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns....
... In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her
husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master-the law giving
him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes,
and in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be
given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women-the law, in all
cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all
power into his hands. 293
Better economic opportunities for women working outside the home make
women's acquiescence to marriage even harder to explain.2 94 Single women
had always fared better in terms of property rights. But the position of single
women became more enviable as they gained greater opportunities to generate
wealth, as opposed to just protect or manage existing wealth. Walter Willcox
conditions in which people expect a lot out of marriage ... .
291. P. 22.
292. Pp. 100-01.
293. Declaration of Sentiments, supra note 82; see also HoEF, supra note 61, at 136
(concluding that the attack on "modem marriage" was one of the few aspects of the Seneca
Falls convention that had "lasting significance").
294. Cf. CoTT, supra note 286, at 6 (describing the 1830s as a "turning point in
women's economic participation"); Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 78 (noting the
greater presence of women in the workforce).
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argued in 1897 that the growing number of women entering the economy
lessened their dependence and therefore their marital ties.295
In divorce court, men brought more claims of abandonment than anything
else, suggesting that some women had the ability to leave, presumably with
some plan for support.296  Abandonment cases sometimes revealed the
husband's frustration with fact that wives had left, often to pursue a career of
some kind. Emma Sutter's husband, for example, filed for divorce after she left
for New York to seek her fame on the stage.297 Frederick Jones secured a
divorce on abandonment grounds after he moved from Kansas to California and
his wife refused to accompany him.298
Economic opportunities may well have had a marginal impact on the
willingness of women to leave a bad marriage-or to decide against marrying
in the first instance. But even by the end of the century, there had been little
progress in dismantling the near universal belief in separate spheres-the idea
that women's place was in the home and men's in the public, commercial
world. For at least six decades into the twentieth century, in fact, courts relied
on the separate spheres as the defining natural order to explain prohibitions on
women's serving on juries, working as bartenders, working long hours, and
practicing law.299
295. WILlCOX, supra note 245, at 67 ("So far as the training of the two sexes prior to
the marriage has been identical, one or the other must be ill fitted for that life; so far as
women's work has become masculine, her ability to make and keep a home happy is
diminished."); see also Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 78 ('The feminist movement
no doubt also affected the law of marriage and divorce. Between 1870 and 1930, too, the
percentage of women in the labor force nearly doubled.").
296. WRIGHT, supra note 110, at 444-601 (reporting that nationwide men sought
divorce based on abandonment more than any other ground); Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda
County Study, supra note 13 (reporting same, in Alameda County). See also Basch, supra
note 76, at 16 (arguing that abandonment by women is a better indication of their autonomy
than filing for divorce).
297. See Gave Up Her Home to Shine on the Stage, OAKLAND TAm., Jan. 2, 1900, at 8.
298. Grossman & Guthrie, Alameda County Study, supra note 13, Docket No. 14942.
299. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (holding that a state may require women,
but not men, to affirmatively register in order to be considered for jury service because of
their domestic responsibilities); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding a
prohibition on women serving as bartenders because of the special "moral and social
problems" it may cause); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding an Oregon
law that forbid female, but not male, employees of a laundry establishment from working
more than ten hours per day because "by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity
continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to
[have] injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race."); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (permitting a state to refuse to allow women
to practice law in part because lawyering would be inconsistent with "the paramount destiny
and mission of woman [] to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother").
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B. Law's Protection of Marriage
The era of divorce substituted a paradigm of serial monogamy, rather than
one modeled on free love or singledom, for the waning ideal of a single,
lifelong marriage. 300 The ability to marry and remarry is what ordinary men
and women wanted, and courts gave expression to those wishes. Hartog's
analysis suggests a role for nineteenth-century courts as marriage-savers-not
necessarily to protect first marriages, or any particular marriage, but marriage
in general.
The nineteenth-century appellate reporters are replete with sweeping
pronouncements about the value of marriage and its importance to society.
Marriage, the Supreme Court warned, "is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. '301 The Court's lauding of marriage was not tied to the idea that
marriages must be lifelong, for this pronouncement came as the Court
sanctioned a husband's reprehensible conduct toward his first wife and family
in order to clear a path for a second marriage. 302 Other courts expressed
similar reverence for marriage.30 3
As Hartog demonstrates, the marriage-saving function was implicated in
several types of cases. In suits to enforce separate maintenance agreements, for
example, courts refrained from enforcing them in part because of concerns
about disrupting marital unity. He questions the invocation of that principle,
300. P. 249. A few feminists rejected this paradigm. Victoria Woodhull, for example,
declared a "war upon marriage," and advocated for short-term, free, and changeable love.
BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER PowERs: THE AGE OF SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE
SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL 274 (1998); see also CoTT, supra note 9, at 68-72
(discussing the emergence of the "free love" radicals in the middle of the century); Babcock,
supra note 84, at 1700 n.51 (collecting biographical sources about "free lover" Victoria
Woodhull).
301. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888); see also Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S.
(23 Wall.) 137, 147 (1874) (Marriage "is the most important transaction of life. The
happiness of those who assume its ties usually depends upon it more than upon anything
else. An eminent writer has said it is the basis of the entire fabric of all civilized society.").
302. See DiFonzo, supra note 59, at 876 n.6 (pointing out the lack of congruence
between the marriage before the Court and the Court's view of marriage as an institution).
303. Powell v. Powell, 1 So. 549, 549-550 (1887) ("The institution of marriage,
established by divine, and perpetuated and guarded by human authority, constitutes the
foundation of organized society, protects private and public morality and virtue, and moulds
the character of the citizens of the commonwealth."). Other state Supreme Courts regarded
marriage with similar reverence. See, e.g., Burdette v. Burdette, 2 Mackey 469, 471 (D.C.
1883) ("mhe preservation of [the] fundamental institution of marriage is even more
important to society than the punishment of its criminals .... ); Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191,
198 (1847) ("Upon the intangible sanctity, and almost indissoluble integrity of the marriage
contract, depends the character and happiness of our population, the perpetuity of our
institutions, the peace of our homes, and all the charities of social life.").
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particularly when the marriages before such courts were so clearly defunct.304
But by refusing to enforce private agreements, courts jeopardized the stability
of informal separations. Without that stability, some women might have been
forced to reunite, and renegotiate, in order to survive. Without enforceable
rights to property, earnings, and children, women were given an incentive to try
their hand at marriage again-with an existing or a subsequent spouse.
Courts' treatment of bigamy cases also fits within this theory. 305 Both
judges and the statutory law they were interpreting gave some protection to
bigamous marriages if they were viable. In one common scenario, a husband
would leave his wife and she, without securing a divorce, would eventually
remarry. As a matter of law (in almost every jurisdiction), the second husband
was entitled to an annulment on grounds of bigamy, while the first was entitled
to a divorce based on adultery. Where the second husband in this type of
scenario actually sought an annulment, he was generally successful. 306 But
where the first husband tried to invalidate the second marriage, courts were less
likely to strike down the bigamous marriage. Courts sometimes relied on
evidentiary presumptions or willful blindness to ignore the bigamy,307 while
state statutes limited the circumstances in which a second marriage was
considered bigamous. New York law, in fact, made bigamous marriages
voidable rather than void if the first husband had been gone for five years. 308
The effect of that characterization was to protect the subsequent, bigamous
marriage as long as it was viable-that is, the second husband was not seeking
to avoid it (though he had the right).309 Thus a pattern is revealed where courts
overlook an obvious offense-bigamy-in order to preserve a viable
marriage. 310
Other nineteenth-century laws reflected a similar deference to viable
marriages. Maine, for example, provided that a decree of divorce or alimony
304. Pp. 82-83.
305. On nineteenth-century bigamy and its relation to American mobility, see
Friedman, supra note 152.
306. See Grossman & Guthrie, supra note 210, at 314.
307. See Pp. 254-55. Bigamy, by many accounts, was common in the nineteenth
century. See, e.g., Timothy J. Gilfoyle, The Hearts of Nineteenth-Century Men: Bigamy and
Working-Class Marriage in New York City, 1800-1890, 19 PROSPEcTS 135, 141 (asserting
that many men "treated bigamy as an informal means of common-law divorce").
308. Pp. 88, 257-58. See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW art. I, § 6 (Banks 1889).
309. Bigamy, then and now, typically renders a marriage void rather than voidable. By
making it voidable (and thus valid if both parties wish it to be), the legislature gave added
protection to marriage by giving the couple discretion to decide whether to invalidate it.
310. Hartog suggests that courts could react less severely to bigamy than to collusion
or illegal separations, because, as long as the second marriage appeared normal, it did not
threaten the "public structure" of marriage. Pp. 89-91. That distinction is somewhat
unsatisfying, as many collusive divorces were not obviously so, and illegal separations were
often explained away by false reports of a spouse's death. Law's legitimacy is arguably
affected more by the particular circumstances of a couple than by whether it involved
bigamy, collusion, or an unlawful separation.
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could be reheard on petition of either party within three years unless either
party had remarried. 311 Legal limitations on the right of remarriage also began
to disappear. Some statutes that precluded adulterous spouses from remarrying
during the lifetime of the aggrieved spouse, for example, were repealed.312
The widespread recognition of common law marriage in the nineteenth
century may also be implicated in the pro-marriage principle. By giving the
name "marriage" to describe committed, but informal relationships, legislatures
may have been trying to superimpose an accepted relationship over an
unacceptable one.3 13
Hartog's conclusions are consistent with Nancy Cott's about the law's
protection of marriage. She reports that juries tended to be lenient in bigamy
cases where the defendant was justified in leaving the first marriage. 314
Judges, she argues, tended to indulge a presumption in favor of marriage,
reflecting in part a shared public policy to foster monogamous marriage. 315
Even legislatures, in moving to liberalize divorce laws, were supporting
marriage. "In altering the terms of marriage, legislators saw themselves as not
interrupting but polishing, refining, and perfecting an ongoing institution. '316
With respect to the sanctity of marriage, Hartog provides a new wrinkle on
a common tale. As the nineteenth century progressed and, particularly as it
gave way to the twentieth, men and women insisted on easier access to
separation and divorce, but in so doing, they were really enforcing their rights
to marital happiness-in the next marriage.3 17 For most, remarriage rather than
311. ME. REv. STAT. ch. 60, § 9(1871).
312- Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw ch. 8, § 53 (Gould 1852) (providing that a
defendant to a divorce based on adultery may not remarry during the lifetime of the
complainant) with N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw ch. 8 § 49 (Banks 1889) (permitting an adulterous
spouse to remarry where the innocent spouse has remarried, five years has elapsed since the
decree of divorce, and "the conduct of the defendant since the dissolution of [the] marriage
has been uniformly good").
313. See Dubler, supra note 8, at 1896 (noting ambiguity in determining whether
recognition of common law marriage was a validation of nontraditional relationships or an
attempt to circumscribe them within conventional boundaries); Dubler, supra note 25, at 969
(arguing that by recognizing common law marriage, "courts reinforced the supremacy of the
institution of marriage by demonstrating that it could subsume under its aegis almost all
long-term domestic forms of ordering"). This may be one example of what Hartog describes
in an earlier article as the "sometimes successful efforts of judges and other legal authorities
to reimpose predictable and generalized legal order on those individual lives." Hartog, supra
note 6, at 98.
314. COTr, supra note 9, at 38.
315. Id. at 39.
316. Id. at47.
317. P. 286. See also Friedman, supra note 28, at 658 ("[T]he immorality of divorce
depends on the sacredness of marriage, but this can only increase the demand for divorce-
to legitimate any second arrangement .... "); Friedman & Percival, supra note 36, at 78
(describing the demand for divorce at the end of the nineteenth century as a "demand for
legitimization of status .... Men and women who had left their old partners wanted to form
new families, have children, live normal economic and social lives.").
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the single life was the goal, and couples began to assume they had a right to
remarry.3 18
CONCLUSION
Man and Wife in America is a tremendous accomplishment that adds to the
history of marriage in important ways. Hartog's most significant contribution
is his account of the importance of separation as a status and to the
development of the law of marriage. It is through separation that Hartog
accomplishes his goal of understanding nineteenth-century husbands and wives
and the choices they made within the governing legal regime.
Hartog emphasizes the importance of traditional aspects of marriage like
unity and standardization, but argues that marital role expectations were not as
rigid as formal law suggests. Coverture, he contends, was rarely enforced to
the letter, bending instead to accommodate the practical needs of separated
wives. He gives persuasive examples of this effect, though he sometimes
overlooks the consequences of strict, formal law on women's claims to equality
and the degree to which new rules perpetuated old systems of oppression.
Hartog also uses separation to draw a more accurate picture of marital exit
and reentry. The newfound mobility of the nineteenth century fundamentally
altered the playing field for married couples by creating new opportunities for,
and new forms of, exit. This mobility facilitated informal exits from
marriage-like simple abandonment and consensual separation-and entry into
sometimes bigamous remarriages. Informal exits have been underemphasized
in the conventional account of nineteenth-century marriage in favor of the
traditional marriage-divorce dichotomy, a narrow approach that insufficiently
captures the range of ways married couples expressed their marital
dissatisfaction in the nineteenth century.
Separation, like divorce, annulment, or death, was one of the options for
marital exit. Hartog's central point is that separation, rather than divorce, was
the desired end for many couples. And informal separation was often preferred
over formal separation. These claims raise important questions about why
couples utilized different options for exit and the consequences of those
decisions. Existing studies, however, do not answer these questions. Studies
showing, in concrete terms, the relative advantages and disadvantages of
separation versus divorce and informal versus formal separation would add
support to his claims. Why, for example, did women desire, or accede to,
informal separation when it gave them little or no protection?
He also reconsiders the relationship between law and the institution of
marriage, findings ways to reconcile the continuing ideal of permanence with
the increasing demand for marital dissolution. Courts and individuals had such
respect for marriage that they looked for ways to allow exit from bad marriages
318. P. 283.
1666 [Vol. 53:1613
July 2001] SEPARATED SPOUSES 1667
in order to clear the way for reentry into better ones. But the question of why
women continued to embrace the often oppressive institution of marriage when
they increasingly had the ability to support themselves due to new legal rights
and greater economic opportunities is worthy of further consideration.
In the end, Hartog has effectively refocused the history of marriage to look
more closely at separation, constructing a convincing account of the
demonstrable ways in which separation made law and law accommodated
separation. Hartog has not only laid a solid groundwork for future research
based on these insights, but also has made significant headway toward
answering the important questions he raises.
